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A NEW PARADIGM FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION:
GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE*
STEPHEN J. FRIEDMAN**
CONNIE

M.

FRIESEN***

"We decide what business we want to be in, and then we get aroundthe
laws."
Words ofa Senior ice Presidentfor
Strategic Planning at a major
money-center bank.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article provides a framework for developing a new regulatory
paradigm for the financial services industry. After introductory comments about the obsolescence of the current regulatory system, it briefly
explores the historical development of such significant regulatory
themes as the dual banking system, multiple federal regulators, the separation of commercial and investment banking, restrictions on interstate
banking, and the special character of banks. Next, following a review of
previous attempts to restructure financial regulation, it concludes that
the creation of a new regulatory paradigm has become necessary, and
* The precursor to this Article was delivered by Mr. Friedman as a lecture to dedicate
the opening of Westminster Hall at the University of Maryland School of Law in May 1983.
The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Paul S. Novak of the Board of Editors of
the Maryland Law Review.
** A.B., Princeton University, 1959; J.D., Harvard University, 1962. Mr. Friedman is a
member of Debevoise & Plimpton, New York City. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Department of the Treasury, 1977-79 and a member of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 1980-81.
*** B.A., Concordia College, 1967; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1972; J.D., Yale University, 1978. Ms. Friesen is an associate with Debevoise & Plimpton, New York City.
1. The Brave New World of Superbanks, NEWSWEEK, July 18, 1983, at 61 [hereinafter cited
as The Brave New World].
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suggests that the process of paradigm-building must begin with an identification of desirable regulatory goals. Finally, the Article proposes that
the most appropriate means for achieving these goals would be through
consistent regulation of similar financial functions regardless of institutional type.

II.

AN OBSOLETE REGULATORY SYSTEM

The financial marketplace2 is governed by a regulatory system that
2. In using the term "financial marketplace," we refer to the mechanisms for accumulating and allocating savings in the capital markets, the stock and commodities exchanges, commercial banks, savings and loan associations, savings banks, credit unions, investment
companies, securities firms, and insurance companies. We shall speak of "financial institutions," "financial intermediaries," and the provision of "financial services." Some observers
have drawn careful distinctions between "financial enterprises" (institutions) and "financial
intermediaries." See Clark, The FederalIncome Taxation of FinancialIntermediaries, 84 YALE L.J.
1605, 1605 n.1 (1975). Clark cites R. GOLDSMITH, FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES IN THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY SINCE 1900, at 50-51 (1958), who states that "financial enterprises...

[include] all economic units. . . that are primarily engaged in the holding of and trading in
intangible assets (claims and equities)." Clark notes that intermediation is simply "the process whereby savings are channeled to investors through intermediaries rather than directly."
Clark, supra, at 1605 n.2.
Since we are concerned with other functions as well as intermediation, we shall use
the term "financial institution" unless the context clearly focuses on the intermediation function. Likewise the term "financial services" will refer to delivery of products and performance
of functions generally associated with financial institutions.
Admittedly, the descriptive terminology for the various types of participants in the
financial marketplace has not matured to precise use and some words would seem to be used
interchangeably depending upon the source. Consider, for example, the following excerpt
from a 1982 U.S. Government publication which provides an alternative way of describing
the financial marketplace in terms of the participants and the functions performed.
[Flinancial institutions and nonfinancial institutions [together] make up our economic universe. The major distinction between the two is that the bulk of the assets
of nonfinancial [institutions] is in the form of real assets, such as plant, equipment,
and inventories of goods, while most of the assets of financial [institutions] take the
form of paper claims.
Financial [institutions] can, in turn, be divided into financial intermediaries
and firms engaged in direct financing. Financial intermediaries are firms that place
themselves between ultimate lenders and ultimate borrowers by purchasing the primary securities of the latter and issuing claims against themselves for the portfolios
of ultimate lenders. Direct financing involves the marketing of primary securities in
such forms as stocks, bonds, and mortgages to those desiring to purchase such securities. The principal direct financing institutions are brokerage firms and investment
[banking firms].
Financial intermediaries can further be divided into depository and nondepository institutions. The four kinds of depository intermediaries are commercial
banks, mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions. Nondepository financial intermediaries consist of contractual savings institutions, on the
one hand, and other financial intermediaries on the other. Of the contractual savings institutions, the most important are life insurance companies, casualty insurance companies, private pension funds, and government pension funds. The
remaining intermediaries include finance companies and mutual funds (or invest-
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developed largely in response to particular historical needs. Increasingly, this system has failed to provide intelligent and uniform administration of the statutes that affect financial institutions and functions.
Although its causes, extent, and cure are sources of disagreement, regulatory obsolescence is acknowledged by representatives of most traditional financial institutions--commercial banks, investment companies,
and insurance companies-as well as by representatives of the regulatory agencies responsible for the supervision of such institutions.' One
recent report noted that "[t]he depression-era system of regulation that
was established in response to a particular set of historic conditions no
longer meets the needs of the public and has resulted in a highly fragmented and antiquated banking system." 4 Another report stated that
"[t]he revolution occurring in the financial services market is rapidly
escalating while the regulated institutions, particularly banks and bank
holding companies, remain fettered by a burdensome regulatory structure."5 In introducing proposed reform legislation, Senator William
ment companies), of which the most rapidly growing component has been money
market funds.
J.

ALLEN, THE CHANGING WORLD OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES AND RELATED INSTITU-

TIONS: SURVEY OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY

(CRS Rep. No. 82-210E, Dec. 30, 1982) (on file with the Maryland Law Review).
3. See, e.g., Letter from Investment Company Institute to Task Group on Regulation of
Financial Services (Bush Task Group) (Apr. 4, 1983) ("[T]he single major regulatory problem
[is] the tremendous and illogical disparity, on both the federal and state levels, between the
regulation of mutual funds and the regulation of all other types of pooled investment media."); Letter from National Association of State Savings & Loan Supervisors to Bush Task
Group (Apr. 1, 1983) (arguing that separation of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board is needed and state-chartered institutions should be freed from "illegal and unwarranted subordination to federal supervision");
Letter from Donald L. Rogers, President of the Associaton of Bank Holding Companies, to
Bush Task Group (Mar. 11, 1983) ("The ability to offer [securities, insurance, and real estate
services] is essential if bank holding companies are to remain viable competitors."); Statement
of American Banker's Association Task Force on Restructuring the Federal Regulatory Agencies in Response to Bush Task Group (Apr. 4, 1983) ("Changes that increase competition
among privately-owned providers of financial services and that reduce regulatory burdens
that hinder the efficient provision of services will improve the financial system's ability to
meet customer needs.").
Of course, not all financial institutions share in this assessment of regulatory obsolescence. Smaller, community financial institutions, in particular, tend to favor a continuatkn
of present regulatory patterns. The National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, for cxampie, has stated that "[o]n the threshold question of whether fundamental change is needed,
our delegates were nearly unanimous that no basic change is necessary at this time." Letter
from Herbert W. Gray, Chairman of the National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, to
Bush Task Group (Mar. 14, 1983).
4. Skinner, Report of the Southern Regional Banking Committee to the Executive Committee of the Southern Growth Policies Board (1983) (prepared for the Eighth Annual Meeting of the National Conference on Financial Services, Apr. 6-8, 1983), reprinted in BANKING
EXPANSION REP., May 16, 1983, at 15.
5. Recommendation of Association of Bank Holding Companies to Bush Task Group
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Proxmire observed that "developments in the marketplace have outpaced the creaky regulatory structure that was established for financial
institutions during the Civil War, the money panics of the turn of the
century, and the Great Depression." 6
A.

Where We Came From

The shape of present financial institutions and their regulatory
agencies is a consequence of the vicissitudes of past economic conditions,
intermittent financial panics, and a constantly changing political climate.7 While changes in financial services regulation have not always
occurred in logical or measured sequence, five basic themes-dual
banking, multiple regulators, the separation of commercial from investment banking, restrictions on interstate banking, and the "special" character of commercial banks-consistently have pervaded debates about
regulatory structure.
I.

Dual Banking Syslem.-The early history of financial services regu-

lation in the United States is, to a large degree, the history of bank regulation. Perhaps the single most significant theme of bank regulation has
been the co-existence of state and federal regulators with sometimes
overlapping jurisdictions. The development of a dual banking system,
however, was not the result of any conscious program for shared power
between national and state regulators. 8 To the contrary, it was a product of the tension between attempts by federal authorities to exert a
measure of control over the banking system and the steadfast resistance
to such control by state and regional interests.
Such conflicts between parochial economic interests-federal vs.
state, aristocratic vs. democratic, capitalist vs. agrarian, mercantile vs.
laissez-faire-have been abundant since the early days of the United
States financial services industry, when the desirability and constitutionality of establishing a Bank of the United States were vigorously debated
political issues.9 The Jeffersonian party opposed the establishment of a
(Mar. 1983) (attached to Letter from Donald L. Rogers, President of the Association of Bank
Holding Companies, to Bush Task Group (Mar. 11, 1983)).
6. 129 CONG. REC. S1515 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1983)(statement of Sen. Proxmire introducing S. 559, the Federal Bank Commission Act of 1983).
7. For an interesting general discussion of traumatic changes in the financial market-

place,

see

C.

KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL

CRISES (1978).

8. Hackley, Our Baffig Banking System, 52 VA. L. REV. 565, 570-71 (1966).
9. See, e.g., R. CATTERALL, THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 164-85 (1902
new impression 1960); P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOSS, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED

STATES 45, 65 (1963).
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federal bank, arguing that the power to create a bank was not an enumerated power of the federal government under the Constitution. l Alexander Hamilton argued that the federal government had an implied
power to establish a bank that would facilitate the performance of governmental functions."1 The subsequent debate over Hamilton's proposal to establish a Bank of the United States focused on the proper roles
of the federal and state governments12 and anticipated many of the issues which have since accompanied the development of the dual bank13
ing system.
The debate over establishing a federal bank was temporarily
mooted in 1791 when Congress granted a twenty-year charter to the first
Bank of the United States. 4 The record of the first Bank of the United
States from 1791 to 1811 was excellent,' 5 and the initial experiment was
considered successful. Many individuals remained opposed to a federal
bank, however, and when the charter expired in 1811, congressional support for its renewal was insufficient. The directors of the bank were
politically inept,' 6 and the vote to renew the charter was lost by a mar17
gin of only one vote in each house.
With the first Bank of the United States out of business, there was a
rapid expansion of state-chartered banks 8 which were needed to help
finance the War of 1812. The financial demands of that war, the sporadic issuance of state bank notes that were not adequately backed by
specie, and the war-related disruption of foreign trade' 9 left the post-war
national economy with intermittent price inflation and deflation, disrupted banking facilities, and a disordered currency.2 ° Moreover, due
10. P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOSS, supra note 9, at 60.
11. Hamilton argued that a national bank would serve a number of important purposes.
First, it would augment the active or productive capital of the country because "[g]old and
silver ...

when deposited in banks, to become the basis of a paper circulation . . . acquire

... an active and productive quality." Second, it would provide "[gireater facility to the
Government, in obtaining pecuniary aids, especially in sudden emergencies." Third, it would
facilitate the payment of taxes through the availability of loans. A. Hamilton, Treasury Report on a National Bank (1790), reprthted in 9 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, Finance Vol. 1, 6768 (1832).
12. E. REED, R. COTTER, E. GILL & R. SMITH, COMMERCIAL BANKING 18 (2d ed. 1980)

[hereinafter cited as

COMMERCIAL BANKING].

13. P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOSS, supra note 9, at 60-61.
14. Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191.
15. B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM
CIVIL WAR

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

209 (1957).

Id. at 222.
Id.
COMMERCIAL BANKING, supra note 12, at 18.
B. HAMMOND, supra note 15, at 227-29.
P. STUDENSKI & H. KROoss, supra note 9, at

82.

THE REVOLUTION TO THE
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to the largely uncontrolled proliferation of state banks, the varieties of
''currency" from bank to bank and from state to state created confusion
and uncertainty which generally impeded interstate commerce.
In 1816, Congress responded to the need to restore order in the
banking and currency system and to return to specie payments 2' by
granting a twenty-year charter for the second Bank of the United
States.22 The second Bank of the United States was subject to much of
the same opposition that had confronted its predecessor. In 181923 and
again in 1824,24 the Supreme Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of a federal bank. Each time, Chief Justice Marshall wrote for
the Court to uphold the Bank's constitutionality. 25 Even after thwarting constitutional attacks, however, and despite congressional support
for its existence, the desirability of a federal bank remained a contentious political issue. After President Andrew Jackson in 1832 vetoed the
legislation to renew its charter,2 6 the second Bank of the United States
went out of existence in 1836.27
With the demise of the second Bank of the United States, and the
absence of national banks during the ensuing twenty-seven years, state
banking entered its second era of great growth.28 State governments
favored the formation of banks to stimulate industry and to provide
sources of public financing.29 In 1837, in Br'scoe v. Bank of Kentucky,30 the
Supreme Court confirmed that states had the right to charter banks,
and upheld the authority of the Commonwealth of Kentucky to create,

21. Id. at 83-84.
22. Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266; see generallyJ. HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF
MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1774-1970, at 145-51 (1973).

23. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819).
24. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 326 (1824).
25. In McCulloch, the Court relied upon the necessary and proper clause and upon Congress's constitutionally conferred powers to declare war and raise revenue. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
at 162-63. In Osborn, the Court reviewed and affirmed McCulloch, noting that the Bank "is an
instrument which is 'necessary and proper' for carrying on the fiscal operations of government." 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 379.
26. P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOSS, supra note 9, at 105; see gentraloJ. MCFAUL, THE POLITICS OF JACKSONIAN FINANCE (1972) (discussing the political climate in Washington and the

banking industry during Andrew Jackson's presidency).
27. Seegeneraly II MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576-89 (D. Richardson ed.
1897) (containing the text of President Andrew Jackson's veto message); R. CATrERALL, supra
note 9 (an engaging historical account of the second Bank from its establishment to its defeat); B. HAMMOND, supra note 15, at 144-450 (containing a detailed discussion of the two
Banks of the United States); R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND

THE MEN WHO MADE IT 56-63 (1948) (discussing the political factors leading to the demise
of the second Bank of the United States).
28. P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOSS, supra note 9, at 107.

29. Id.
30. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 256 (1837).
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as its exclusive property, the Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky
with the authority to issue bank notes as currency.3 '
In this environment, with the second Bank of the United States out
of existence, the constitutionality of state-chartered banks confirmed,
and the use of state banks on the rise, 32 the concept of "free banking"
became popular as a "proper solution to the difficult banking problems
of the 1830's." '3 3 The business of banking was to be open to all market
participants who wished to compete. Competition, not governmental
intervention, would regulate the financial marketplace.
Although a pure free banking system was never adopted in the
United States, New York in 1838 enacted a Free Banking Act3 4 which
was copied by other states, and such state legislation contributed to the
rapid expansion of state banking between 1836 and 1863. During these
years of so-called "wildcat" banking there was no federal paper currency, state laws were lax, and the banks created under them did little to
inspire public confidence. 35 The growth of state banks was accompanied in too many instances by unsound banking practices and the excessive issuance of bank notes. 6 Many of these state banks were owned
and operated by entrepreneurs who had an eye for short-term profit but
lacked an understanding of banking, economics, or finance. 37 Moreover, as the Civil War approached, the federal government found itself

38
with no central bank to act as its fiscal agent.
Congress in 1863 responded to the banking situation by passing the
National Currency Act,3 9 which was enacted both to finance the Civil

31. Id.passim.
The opinion in Brircoe was tempered, however, by Justice Story's dissent. He cautioned that states could create banks and authorize them to issue bank notes as currency but
"subject always to the control of Congress, whose powers extend to the entire regulation of the
currency of the country." Id. at 348 (Story, J., dissenting).
32. Klebaner, State-CharteredAmericanCommercialBanks 1781-1801, 53 Bus. HIST. REV. 529
(1979).
33. F. REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN BANKING: MEN AND IDEAS (pt. 2) at 187
(1951 & photo. reprint 1968).
34. B. HAMMOND, supra note 15, at 583-84.
35. See Hacldey, supra note 8, at 570; see generally Hammond, Hirton'cal Introduction, in
BANKING STUDIES 9-10 (1941) (in some states banking was a prohibited activity at various
times during the 1840's and 1850's).
36. COMMERCIAL BANKING, supra note 12, at 19.
37. See P. STUDENSKI & H. KRooss, supra note 9, at 73-74.
38. Id. at 137.
39. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665. President Lincoln had recommended the
establishment of a "uniform currency" to be provided by banking associations organized
under a "general act" of the Congress. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 88TH CONG., IST SEss., FEDERAL BANKING LAWS AND REPORTS: A COMPILATION
OF MAJOR FEDERAL BANKING DOCUMENTS 1780-1912, at 306 (Comm. Print 1963).
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War effort by stimulating the sale of government securities40 and to promote a uniform currency. The National Currency Act provided for the
organization of national banks which would possess the authority to issue bank notes secured by government bonds. It also established a separate bureau within the Department of the Treasury, under a
Comptroller of the Currency, which was given authority to approve the
formation of national banks.4 ' Subsequently, the National Currency
Act was replaced by legislation which has since become known as the
National Bank Act of 1864 (National Bank Act).42 Although it is often
considered to be a fundamental component of the dual banking system, 4 3 the National Bank Act was intended, at least in part, to hasten
44
the demise of state banking.
In 1865, in a further effort to reduce the number of state banks, 4
Congress passed a ten percent per annum tax on state bank notes.46 The
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the tax in 1869. 4 7 The
tax's impact upon state banks, however, was not as great as expected. In
a classic market response to regulation, deposit banking and the use of
checks as an alternative to bank notes became widespread.4 8 Moreover,
many banks still preferred to operate under state charters because state
regulation was generally less restrictive than federal regulation.
2. Competing Federal Regulatoly Agencies.-The interagency competition and the potential for chaos inherent in the dual banking system
have been compounded by the existence of multiple regulators at the
federal level. In 1908, following the financial "panic" of 1907, a National
Monetary Commission studied the need for revising mandatory reserve
requirements for commercial banks as well as the need for a more elastic

40. Hackley, supra note 8, at 570.
41. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665.
42. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99. The legislation was entitled "An Act to
Provide a National Currency, Secured by a Pledge of United States Bonds and to Provide for
the Circulation and Redemption Thereof." For discussion on the codification of the provisions of the National Bank Act that have survived to the present, see Levin, In Search ofthe
NationalBank Act, 97 BANKING L.J. 741, 743, 750 n.26 (1980).
43. At least one federal circuit court has exhibited this confusion. In Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 932 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976), the
circuit court observed that "[w]hen Congress established our dual banking system it wisely
placed at one cornerstone the principle of competitive equality between state and national
banks."
44. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1139 (1865).
45. Hackley, supra note 8, at 573.
46. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, § 6, 13 Stat. 469, 484.
47. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
48. See generally J. HURST, supra note 22, at 50-53 (discussing the increased use of bank
deposits and checks as a source of greater liquidity).
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currency.4 9 Initially, the National Monetary Commission favored establishing a central banking institution,5" but there was little political support for such an approach. Later, a compromise was reached which
called for establishing eight to twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks
that were to operate under the general supervision of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board). 5 Membership in the Federal Reserve System was mandatory for all nationallychartered banks and elective for state-chartered banks. Members were
required to buy stock in a regional reserve bank and submit to its regulation.5 2 Consequently, all nationally-chartered banks were subject to
regulation by both the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal
Reserve Board.
State banks were permitted to join the Federal Reserve System
while still retaining their state charters as long as they met minimum
capital and reserve requirements. 53 Membership brought with it regulation by the Federal Reserve System as well as by the state regulator.
Alternatively, state banks could choose to forego the benefits of membership and remain free of federal supervision altogether.
The next significant step in the evolution of overlapping state and
federal jurisdiction was the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC),54 the third major component of the federal regulatory structure. Under the terms of the Vandenberg Amendment to the
Banking Act of 1933," 5 all banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System were required to have their deposits insured by the FDIC;
non-member banks could receive insurance coverage upon application
to and approval by the FDIC. The 1933 legislation was temporary, but
the federal deposit insurance system was adopted permanently in
1935.56 As Friedman and Schwartz have observed, the Banking Act of
1933 "neither abolished nor reduced the powers of any existing government body concerned with banking. '57 Rather, "it simply superimposed an additional agency, the FDIC, whose functions both

49.
50.
51.
52.
at 574.
53.

Hackley, supra note 8, at 573.
P. STUDENSKI & H. KROoss, supra note 9, at 254-55.
J. HURST, supra note 23, at 206.
Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 2, 38 Stat. 251, 252 (1913); see also Hackley, supra note 8,
HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, CHANGES IN THE BANKING AND CUR-

H.R. REP. No. 69, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1913).
54. The FDIC was created by the Vandenburg Amendment to the Banking Act of 1933,
ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 168 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1982)).
55. Id.
56. M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
1867-1960, at 434-35 (1963).
57. Id. at 435.
RENCY SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES,
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supplemented and duplicated those of existing agencies."" 8 Moreover,
the federal deposit insurance system provided an incentive for statechartered non-member banks to submit to the federal regulatory control
of the FDIC. By the end of 1982 the FDIC had become the primary
regulator for 8833 state-chartered non-member banks.59
In the 1930's, the power of the Federal Reserve System grew, extending to administration of the restrictions governing securities activities by banks, to enforcement of deposit interest rate controls, and in
1956, to the regulation of bank holding companies. Congress, in the
1930's, also began to expand federal control of other segments of the
financial services industry. The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) was created in 1934 to regulate activities traditionally associated
with investment banking and securities brokerage.' ° The Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) was established in 1932 to supervise the savings and loan industry and facilitate home mortgage financing. 61 More
recently, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) was established in 197062 and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) was established in 1974.63 Even in the area of insurance, an
industry for the most part regulated at the state level,64 Congress in 1974
extended federal regulation to insured pension plans through the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the creation of
65
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).
3.

The Separation of Commercial Banking from Certain Securities Act-'vi

ties.-The banking system that developed in the United States in the
nineteenth century was based upon the British tradition of separation of
commercial and investment banking functions and was influenced by
58. Id.
59. FEDERAL DEPOsrr INSURANCE CORPORATION, 1982 STATISTICS ON BANKING 6 (statistics provided as of December 31, 1982).
60. The SEC was established by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 4, 48
Stat. 885 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (1982)).
61. The FHLBB was established by the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, ch. 522,
47 Stat. 725 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1982)); see generally T. MARVELL, THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD (1969).

62. The NCUA was established in 1970. Act of Mar. 10, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-206, 84
Stat. 49 (1970).
63. The CFTC was established in 1974 by the Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 93463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 and 7 U.S.C. (1982)).
64. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982); SEC v. Variable Annuity

Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 68-69 (1959). But cf United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,
322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944) (the interstate activities of insurance enterprises are subject to
Congress' control under the commerce clause).

65. The PBGC was established by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, tit. IV, § 4002,88 Stat. 829, 1004 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.

§ 1302 (1982)).
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the belief that public deposits should not be committed to investment
banking, which was considered to be inherently speculative and risky.6 6
Section 8 of the National Bank Act expressed this philosophy by not
including investment banking among the enumerated powers of national banks.67
At least in part because of competitive pressures from state banks
during the 1860's and 1870's, however, courts initially adopted a permissive interpretation of the National Bank Act. For example, the phrase
"by discounting and negotiating promissory notes" was interpreted to
include an implied power of national banks to invest in state, municipal,
and corporate bonds.' The limits of judicial permissiveness were not
defined clearly until First National Bank of Charlotte v. National Exchange
Bank of Baltimore, 9 in which the Supreme Court stated that the prohibition on stock trading contained in the National Bank Act prevented national banks from investing in corporate securities and stock for profit. 7 °
In contrast, state-chartered banks and trust companies were generally
permitted to engage in investment banking activities. Trust companies,
in particular, enjoyed rather broad securities powers under state
charters. 7 '
Other securities activities of national banks were similarly curtailed
in the early twentieth century. In 1902, the Comptroller of the Currency
concluded that the National Bank Act did not permit national banks to
72
participate in the underwriting and distribution of equity securities.
66. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking.- A History, 88 BANKING L.J.
484, 485 (1971). For a comprehensive discussion of historical and current issues in the area of
separation of commercial banking from investment banking, see generally H. Pitt & J. Williams, The Evolving Financial Services Industry: Statutory and Regulatory Framework and
Current Issues in the Banking Securities Arena (outline prepared for the American Bar Association National Institute on Financial Institutions: An Assessment of the New Products,
Structure, Marketing and Regulation, Boston, Massachusetts, Apr. 27-28, 1983).
67. The National Bank Act of 1864 included the following list of powers for national
banks:
[A]ll such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking
by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other
evidence of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and
bullion; by loaning money on personal security; [and] by obtaining, issuing, and
circulating notes according to the provisions of this act.
Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 88, 13 Stat. 99, 101.
68. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bennington, 9 F. Cas. 97 (C.C.D. Vt. 1879) (No. 4807)
(interpreting the clause in the National Bank Act, "by discounting and negotiating promissory notes," to include investing in municipal bonds); Newport Nat'l Bank v. Board of Educ.,
114 Ky. 87, 70 S.W. 186 (1902) (same).
69. 92 U.S. 122 (1875).
70. Id.at 128.
71. Perkins, supra note 66, at 487.
72. See, e.g., F. REDLICH, supra note 33, at 393.
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Prodded by the need to compete with full service state banks, a number
of major national banks responded to the comptroller's ruling by creating nonbank securities affiliates chartered under state law. These affiliates were free from federal regulation and were able to engage in the
underwriting of corporate securities.73 In 1912, Congress established the
Pujo Committee to investigate the involvement of commercial banks in
investment banking activities." The report of the Pujo Committee concluded that it was illegal for national banks to purchase and sell equity
securities, and expressed "grave doubt [about] the power of national
banks to buy and sell bonds." 75
The outbreak of World War I, however, provided an opportunity
for expanded national bank involvement in the distribution of securities.
Many of the Liberty Bonds76 issued by the federal government were sold
through national banks. As a result, national banks developed efficient
systems for distributing securities and enjoyed the benefits of investor
confidence because Liberty Bonds were of unquestioned soundness. 7 At
the end of World War I, the marketing systems that had so successfully
distributed Liberty Bonds went searching for new products to sell.
Meanwhile, state banks were expanding their investment banking
activities and the dual banking system exerted increased pressure on federal regulators. Because the federal government wished to encourage
state banks and trust companies to enter the Federal Reserve System,
these state-chartered institutions were allowed to become member banks
without giving up the investment banking privileges granted to them by
state law.78 Competitive pressures then forced the Comptroller of the
Currency to permit national banks to engage in modified securities activities. 79 The Comptroller of the Currency's Annual Report of 1924
recommended legislation permitting national banks to buy and sell se73. See id.; see also H. WILLIS & J. CHAPMAN, THE BANKING SITUATION 186-87 (1934)
(describing the various securities activities of typical securities affiliates).
74. The Pujo Committee was a subcommittee of the House Committee on Banking and
Currency authorized by Congress in H.R. Res. 429, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912), to investigate
the monetary and banking conditions in the United States with a view toward remedial legislation. The recommendations of the Pujo Committee are contained in REPORT OF THE
COMM. APPOINTED PURSUANT TO HOUSE RESOLUTIONS 429 AND 504 To INVESTIGATE THE
CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL OF MONEY AND CREDIT, H.R. REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d
Sess. 162 (1913).
75. H.R. REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 152.
76. Liberty Bonds were issued by the United States in 1917, 1918, and 1919 to finance the
participation of the United States in World War I and to fund loans to the Allied Powers. G.
MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 558 (F. Garcia 8th ed. rev. 1983).
77. W. PEACH, THE SECURITY AFFILIATES OF NATIONAL BANKS 31-33 (1941).
78. SetC. TIPPErrs, STATE BANKS AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 109-12 (1929).
79. W. PEACH, supra note 77, at 150.
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curities through affiliates."0 Throughout the 1920's there was an enormous expansion in bank underwriting of corporate debt securities, and
by the end of that decade the bank share of that market exceeded sixty
percent.8 '
The presumed existing power of national banks to underwrite investment securities through affiliates was confirmed by the Pepper-McFadden Act (McFadden Act) in 1927.82 The provisions of the
McFadden Act that purported to ratify the securities activities of banks
were not without opposition, however. Senator Carter Glass was prominent among those who contended that the proper role of banks was not
to underwrite securities but was rather to allocate capital to productive
uses and enterprises through commercial loans.8 3 The collapse of the
stock market in 1929, in part attributable to the startling incompetence
of the Federal Reserve Board in not acting to curb speculative activity
by commercial banks,8 4 further convinced Senator Glass and others that
the separation of commercial and investment banking was fundamental
to the integrity of the national banking system.8 5
As a result of the efforts of Senator Glass and Congressman Henry
Steagall, among others, Congress in 1933 adopted the Glass-Steagall
Act,8 6 which drew a wavy line between commercial banking and certain
forms of investment banking. National banks were barred from underwriting and dealing in all securities except treasury securities and state
and local general obligation bonds,8 7 but retained their authority to invest in "investment grade" corporate bonds and state and local revenue

80. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1924).

81. Perkins, supra note 66, at 495, 527.
82. Ch. 191, § 2(b), 44 Stat. 1224, 1227 (1927) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 378
(1982)).
83. See Brokers' Loans: Hearingson S Res. 113 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928).
84. J. GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929, at 32-47 (1961).
85. See H. WILLIS & J. CHAPMAN, supra note 73, at 67-71 (discussing some of the considerations which led the Senate Banking Committee, under Chairman Glass, to advocate the
separation of commercial and investment banking); Perkins, supra note 66, at 499 (quoting
excerpt from Letter of Sen. Carter Glass, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1929) ("As a purely business
proposition I would like to see excessive marginal speculation [by banks] abated. . . . My
concern has been for the economic integrity of the Federal Reserve banking system."). See
generally S. Friedman & C. Barber, Financial Markets in 1920-1933 (1981) (outline prepared
for the Ninth Annual University of California, San Diego, Securities Regulation Institute)
(summarizing the factors considered by legislators prior to the enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933, including the efficacy of securities affiliates of commercial banks).
86. Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1982)).
87. Id. § 16, 48 Stat. 162, 184 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982)).
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bonds."8 Moreover, while the Act permitted banks to offer brokerage
services, it did so in an obscure way; 9 its method of dealing with securities affiliates was pregnant with loopholes, many of which have only
recently been exploited.'

4. Restrictions on Interstate Bankz'ng.-Commercial banking enterprises
are unique among major American businesses in that, historically, they
have not been permitted to engage in business in more than one state.9 '
The foundation of this state-by-state banking system is the legal authority of each state to prohibit out-of-state institutions from operating
branch banks within its territory. 92 Moreover, at the federal level, national banks and state member banks have been barred from interstate
branching since the passage of the McFadden Act in 1927. 9'
The McFadden Act dealt with branch banking, but did not address
the issue of bank holding companies owning separate banks in more
than one state. The issue finally was addressed by the Douglas Amendment 94 to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956." 5 Under the Douglas Amendment, states are presumed to want to exclude from their
banking industries not only branches of out-of-state banks, but also instate banks owned by any bank holding company that controls a state or
national bank in another state. 96 Time, however, has not been kind to
restrictions on interstate banking activity. During the past decade,
many of the nation's largest banks have made successful efforts to establish an extensive interstate presence notwithstanding current prohibitions on interstate banking.97
88. See generally Rogowski, Commercial Banks and Muntcipal Revenue Bonds, 95 BANKING L.J.
155 (1978).
89. Pitt & Williams, The Glass-SteagallAct. Key Issues to the FinancialServiies Industry, II
SEC. REG. L.J. 234, 237 (1983).
90. See, e.g., OCC Approves National Bank Charterfor Trust Company Owned by Mutual Fund
Adviser and Broker, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 99,463 (Feb.
2, 1983).
91. Ginsburg, Interstate Banking, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133, 1137 & n.1 (1981).
92. See id. at 1152-59.
93. Ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228 (1927) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36
(1982)).
94. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
95. Id §§ 1841-1850.
96. Ginsberg, supra note 91, at 1167.
97. See Brouillette, Interstate Banking.- One Thn)'s Experrence, Am. Banker, Apr. 4, 1984, at
1; Carrington, FinancialFracas: Some Bankers Step Up Drive to Win the Right to Enter New Fields,
Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1984, at 1, col. 6 (discussing the efforts of banks to overcome restrictive
regulation and enter new industries such as real estate, securities, underwriting, and insurance); Fraust, Banks Stake Out an Interstate Future, Am. Banker, Apr. 2, 1984, at I [hereinafter
cited as Fraust, Banks Stake Out an Interstate Future];Fraust, Crossing State Lines: How Some Banks
Did It, Am. Banker, Apr. 3, 1984, at 1, 9 [hereinafter cited as Fraust, Crossing State Lines]; f
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5. Banks as "Special"Institutions.-Thefinal distinguishing characteristic of the evolution of financial institutions has been the special role
accorded to banks. Over time, there has been a progressively deepening
commitment by the federal government to the safety and soundness of
the banking system. The creation of the FDIC,9 the role of the Federal
Reserve Board as the lender of last resort, 99 and the conviction in the
marketplace that federal financial regulators would never permit a major bank to "go under'' are evidence of that commitment. Changes in
the financial markets, however, have made it increasingly more difficult
to decide which institutions are "banks."' '
Writing for the Supreme Court in 1963, Justice Brennan in United
States v. PhiladelphiaNationalBank °2 noted the distinctive ability of banks
to accept demand deposits as well as the unique role of banks in providing business credit.' 0 3 In agreeing that the "cluster of products . . . and
services.

. .

denoted by the term 'commercial banking'.

.

. [composed]

a distinct line of commerce," the Supreme Court stated that "[s]ome
commercial banking products or services [such as the checking account]
are so distinctive that they are entirely free of effective competition from
products or services of other financial institutions. ' 104 Since the Philadelphia National Bank decision, however, the term "deposit" has been
more and more broadly construed and courts have determined that it no
McMurray, FinancialFracas.-Banks and Rivals Push Into New Businesses as Congress Dawdles,Wall
St. J., Mar. 23, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
98. See supra note 54.
99. "Under the over-all supervision of the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Banks
perform many varied functions for the banking community. Through the operation of its
'discount window,' a Reserve Bank may lend funds to member banks, and. . . other depository institutions." HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 98TH
CONG., IST SEss., FORMATION AND POWERS OF NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONS-A LEGAL PRIMER 1-36 (Comm. Print 1983) (prepared by Natter) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1982)).
The Board of Governors has the statutory authority to "authorize any Federal reserve bank
• . . to discount [eligible collateral] for any individual, partnership, or corporation." 12
U.S.C. § 343 (1982).
100. See generally Warning Lights for Bank Soundness. Special Issue on Commercial Bank Surveillance, ECON. REV., Nov. 1983 (published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta).
101. Some commentators still adhere to the view that banks are special and that banking
and nonbanking activities are readily distinguishable for regulatory purposes. Gerald E. Corrigan, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, for example, has argued that
there are three unique characteristics of banks: "I. Banks offer transaction accounts; 2. Banks
are the back-up source of liquidity for all other institutions; 3. Banks are the transmission belt
for monetary policy." Corrigan further observes that "[i]t is clear that these essential characteristics are highly complementary and furthermore that it is the relationship among them
that best captures the essence of what makes banks special." Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Are Banks Special?, in ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1982).
102. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
103. Id. at 326-27.
104. Id. at 356.
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longer provides a clear line of division between banks and "nonbank
banks."" 5
B.

Where We Are Today

Economic events and the shifting demands for more and different
financial services have prompted innovation among the various sectors
of the financial services industry. Innovation and adaptation have in
turn encouraged cross-industry competition which has threatened the
integrity of a regulatory structure initially based on the premise that
each type of financial institution had distinct functions, operated in a
distinct sector of the capital markets, and could best be served by a separate regulator. The validity of that premise was evanescent, and the
structure which rested upon it has crumbled with the erosion of the
foundation. 106
105. See, e.g., Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 938-42 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976) (interpreting "deposits" as including those types of transactions conducted at an "electronic teller": (1)ordinary deposits into a checking or savings
account; (2) transfers of funds between two accounts; and (3) payments on installment loans
or credit card accounts).
The term "nonbank bank" has been defined as:
an organization that evades the Bank Holding Company Act's two-pronged definition of a bank as an institution that both accepts demand deposits and makes commercial loans. By stripping a bank of one of those activities, a company owning
such an institution may avoid the [Bank Holding Company] Act's prohibitions
against nonbanking organizations controlling banks and against interstate banking,
and avoid regulation by the Federal Reserve Board, which administers the [Bank
Holding Company] Act.
IBAA Assails OCC's Nonbank Policies in Letter to Reagan, Others, 42 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No.
11, at 442 (Mar. 12, 1984); see alsouse When Is a Bank Not a Bank? When It Is An Abomination,
Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1984, at 1,col. 4 ("What makes a bank nonbank is that it has been
slightly reorganized [by eliminating either its deposit taking or commercial lending activities]
by a nonbanking corporate owner to avoid Federal Reserve Board regulation.").
The Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the Currency have disagreed vigorously over the comptroller's willingness to approve nonbank banks. See, e.g., Comptroller
Expresses Dismay Over Penney End Run Around Moratorium, Am. Banker, Apr. 29, 1983, at 1. Significant opposition to nonbank bank expansion has also been voiced by representatives of the
securities and mutual funds industries. They are particularly wary of regulatory actions and
legislative changes which would permit nonbank banks to enter the investment banking industry without granting investment bankers reciprocal access to compete in commercial
banking activities. Testifying before the Senate Banking Committee on March 7, 1984,
David Silver, President of the Investment Company Institute, recommended that the GlassSteagall Act be restored to its "pristine purity" and said that "nonbank banks are being
established not because of a weakness in Glass-Steagall but because regulators are acting like
'non-cop cops' by failing to enforce the banking laws." Securities Investment Companies Opposedto
Giving Banks New Powers, 42 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 11, at 431, 433 (1984).
106. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Committee on Developments in Investment Services, Homogenization
of FinancialInstitutions The Legislative and Regulatory Response, 38 Bus. LAW. 241 (1982); Clark,
The Soundness of FinancialIntermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1 (1976); Wallison, Banking Regulatogy
System Badly in Need of Reform, Legal Times, June 27, 1983, at 27.
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Traditionally, financial institutions have been treated as either investment institutions, insurance institutions, or depository institutions,
on the assumption that each type of institution performed readily identifiable and separable functions.' °7 In recent years, however, product
lines have been blurred, institutional characterization has become less
significant, and federal regulators have attempted to keep pace with an
expanding "financial services industry."' ' Brokers and financial conglomerates have offered money market mutual funds and attracted billions of dollars in deposits from investors looking for higher interest rates
than those banks could offer under federal law.' °9 Banks provide discount brokerage services," 0 operate as futures commission merchants,"'
and have attempted to enter the insurance business." 2 Savings and
107. See, e.g., Wallison, supra note 106, at 27.
108. See generally Carrington, supra note 97; McMurray, supra note 97; The Brave New World,
supra note 1;FinancialMorass: Deregulation of Banks Stirs Confiusion, Splits Fed and White House,
Wall St. J., July 1, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
109. The lifting of interest rate restrictions under the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation
Q, 12 C.F.R. § 217.0 (1983), has, of course, shifted some of these funds away from money
market mutual funds and into money market deposit accounts (MMDAs) and other deposit
accounts offered by banks. Federal Reserve Board statistics for June 1983 indicate a total of
$367.3 billion held in MMDAs and $178.5 billion held in money market mutual funds. Aoney
Stock Measures and Components, 69 FED. RESERVE BULL. 15 (1983). In June 1982, $202.3 billion
was held in money market mutual funds. Money Stock Aeasures and Components, 68 FED. RESERVE BULL. 13 (1983). The Depository Institutions Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982),
authorized a phase out of the ceilings on the maximum rates of interest and dividends that
could be paid on deposits. Subsequently, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 327, 96 Stat. 1469, 1501 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. & 15 U.S.C. (1982)), directed the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee to
establish regulations for the new MMDAs. These regulations are set forth at 12 C.F.R.
§ 1204.122 (1983).
110. See, e.g., Release and Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 99,284 (Aug. 26, 1982) (approving an application
from Security Pacific National Bank to offer discount brokerage services through its new subsidiary, Security Pacific Discount Brokerage Services, Inc.).
Some banks have entered the discount brokerage business by offering in-house brokerage services directly to their customers. See Bisky, How Are Banks Doing as Discount Brokers?,
A.B.A. BANKING J., Sept. 1983, at 43. Other banks have teamed up with independent brokerage firms. See OCC Approves Discount Brokerage Acquzsition, BANKING EXPANSION REP., Oct. 4,
1982, at 4.
111. See, e.g., Wallison, supra note 106 ("in April 1982 the Comptroller gave preliminary
approval to an application by North Carolina National Bank to establish a futures commission merchant subsidiary, which would broker financial futures purchased or sold for hedging
by commercial clients"); Norwest Bank Setting Up FinancialFutures Trading Division in Chicago,
Am. Banker, June 13, 1983, at 3 (in June 1983, Norwest Bank of Minneapolis set up a financial futures division based in Chicago).
112. South Dakota Senate Bill No. 256, signed by the Governor of South Dakota on
March 4, 1983, and entitled "An act to revise the provisions for ownership, powers, operation
and taxation of certain banks and their subsidiaries and to declare an emergency" permitted
out-of-state banks and bank holding companies to enter the insurance business in South Dakota. 1983 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 346, § 39 (codified at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 51-18-30
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loan associations and banks are used as retail outlets for sales of insurance contracts underwritten by independent insurers. 1 3 Insurance
companies have offered variable annuities and variable life insurance
contracts having securities attributes as well as insurance attributes.14
Financial products and institutions that cross traditional industry lines
have become commonplace.
1

Cross-IndustgProducts.-(a) The CentralAsset Management Account.-

The central asset management account combines features traditionally
found in checking accounts, money market funds, and brokerage accounts."t 5 It also presents a clear example of the problems associated
with devising an effective regulatory scheme for cross-industry products.
As long as jurisdiction is limited by notions of institutional type, it will
be difficult to devise an effective regulatory plan for products like the
(Supp. 1983)). Citicorp described its plans to enter the insurance business in an application
dated May 13, 1983, to acquire American State Bank of Rapid City, South Dakota. As described in its application to the Federal Reserve Board, Citicorp intended to offer life insurance products, property and casualty insurance, accident and health insurance, and mortgage
guaranty insurance, and its insurance activities concerning these products would include underwriting, marketing, and sales. Citicorp's Insurance Plans, BANKING ExPANSION REP., July
18, 1983, at 5.
113. Savings and loan service corporations may provide insurance brokerage or agency
services for liability, casualty, automobile, life, health, accident, or title insurance, but may
not provide private mortgage insurance. 12 C.F.R. § 545.74(c)(5)(ii) (1984).
114. See, e.g., Dorsett, Universal Life Emerges from "Product Revolution," 122 TR. & EST., July
1983, at 22.
115. See, e.g., Advertisementfor Dean Witter's Active Assets Account, Wall St. J., July 20, 1983, at
49, col. 1; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Prospectus for Cash Management
®
Account , dated Sept. 14, 1983.
As advertised, features of Dean Witter's Active Assets Account included the following:
1. Check writing privileges-no minimum balance, no monthly fee, no per check
service charge, no limit on amount of checks or on how many customer can use.
2. Automatic sweep into money market fund.
3. Charge card privileges.
4. Check cashing after hours.
5. Securities in brokerage account insured for up to $25 million.
Wall St. J., July 20, 1983, at 49, col. 1.
The prospectus for the Cash Management Account* program (CMAO) of Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. states that the CMAO offers integrated financial services
by linking together three components. Generally, those components are as follows:
1. Securities Account-A conventional Merrill Lynch securities margin account.
2. Money Account-Three no-load money funds investing in short-term securities
0
Tax-Exempt
(CMA Money Fund, CMA Government Securities Fund, and CMA
Fund).
3. Visa Account-A Visa check/card account maintained by Bank One of Columbus, N.A., Columbus, Ohio.
®
Free credit balances held in the Securities Account of persons subscribing to CMA
services are automatically invested in shares of one of three Money Funds or deposited with a
depository institution, whichever is designated by the participant as the primary account.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., supra.
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central asset management account. For example, the SEC regulates
mutual funds and sales of securities and the bank regulatory agencies
regulate intermediaries that accept deposits and offer transaction accounts. In the case of the central asset management account, although
there is a bank in the picture, that bank holds no funds. It performs
operations functions and runs a zero balance checking account. The
real "deposit" is in the money market fund or, on a more transitional
basis, in the free credit balance held at the brokerage firm.
(b) Variable Insurance Contracts.-Traditionally, the activities of the insurance industry have been regulated at the state level. Insurance products such as variable annuity contracts, however, have incorporated
features not traditionally associated with insurance. The variable annuity was developed as an alternative to fixed dollar annuities which did
not reflect inflationary declines in the purchasing power of the dollar.
When the Supreme Court determined that variable annuity contracts
were securities,' 16 they became subject to regulation by the SEC in addition to regulation by insurance and securities commissioners at the state
level. Thereafter, insurance company separate accounts were made to
fit the mold of investment company regulation under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act).117 Subsequently,
however, even when new products, such as variable life insurance, have

116. In SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (the VALIC case), the
Court held that the variable annuity contract in question was a security outside the exemption provided by § 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (1982). The
provision exempts "any insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annuity contract, issued by a corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner,
bank commissioner, or any agency . . .of any State . . .or the District of Columbia." Id.
The Court analyzed both the mortality risk and the investment risk of the variable annuity
contract in question:
In some respects the variable annuity has the characteristics of the fixed and conventional annuity: payments are made periodically; they continue until the annuitant's death or in case other options are chosen until the end of a fixed term or until
the death of the last of two persons. . . . Each issuer assumes the risk of mortality
from the moment the contract is issued . . . . It is this feature.

. . that respondents

stress when they urge that this is basically an insurance device.
The difficulty is that, absent some guarantee of fixed income, the variable
annuity places all the investment risks on the annuitant, none on the company. The
holder gets only a pro rata share of what the portfolio of equity interests reflectswhich may be a lot, a little, or nothing.
359 U.S. at 70-71.
The Court concluded that, in the case of the variable annuity contract before it,
"[t]here is no true underwriting of risks, the one earmark of insurance as it has commonly
been conceived of in popular understanding and usage." Id. at 73.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3) (1982).
Insurance companies are exempt from the Investment Company Act if they are "organized as an insurance company, whose primary and predominant business activity is the
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been structured to avoid the same regulatory fate as the variable annuity, the SEC has asserted jurisdiction, creating further questions about
the reach of the Investment Company Act." 8
2. Cross-Industry Instituions.-So-called near-banks illustrate the
structural and organizational changes that are making traditional distinctions among institutional types untenable. "Near-banks" are financial conglomerates, sometimes called "financial supermarkets," that
offer a complete range of financial services to their customers. They
often include "nonbank banks,"'1 9 which carry on many traditional
banking functions but avoid many of the prohibitions on securities and
interstate activities by escaping the classification of a "bank" under section 1841(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act 12 0 or under other statutes which define "bank" by reference to the Bank Holding Company
Act definition. The result is a single enterprise, one part of which may
be supervised by one or more bank regulators, another part by state
insurance regulators, another part by the SEC, and yet another part by
the CFTC, without comprehensive regulatory oversight.
A number of significant and highly visible national and regional
corporations have entered the financial services industry and tested the
writing of insurance. . . and which is subject to supervision by the insurance commissioner
• . . of a State ....
" Id. § 80a-2(a)(17). In the VALIC case, the Court observed that:
While the term "security" as defined in the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1)] is
broad enough to include any "annuity" contract, and the term "investment company" as defined in the Investment Company Act [15 U.S.C. § 80a-3] would embrace an "insurance company," the scheme of the exceptions lifts pro tanto the
requirements of those two Federal Acts to the extent that [entities] are actually regulated by the States as insurance companies, if indeed the are such.
359 U.S. at 67-68 (emphasis in original). See also G. Hughes, The Insurance Industry: Products, Distribution Channels and the Challenge of Integrating Financial Services (outline prepared for Sixty-Fourth American Assembly, Apr. 7-10, 1983, Arden House, Harriman, New
York, The Future of American Financial Services Institutions).
118. See, e.g., 498 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) G-1 (Apr. 11, 1979). The text accompanying footnote 20 of the release notes that "whether a company which issues a variety of contracts, some of which qualify as 'insurance' or 'annuities' and, thus, are exempt under section
3(a)(8) of the Act, would be an investment company is a question of fact. A company's status
will depend, in the final analysis, upon its total mix of business and the relationship of its
securities business to its conventional insurance business." Id. n.20.
119. See supra note 105.
120. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982). Section 1841(c) states that:
"[b]ank" means any institution organized under the laws of the United States, any
State of the United States, the District of Columbia, any territory of the United
States . . . except an institution the accounts of which are insured by the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation or an institution chartered by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, which (1) accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal
right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages in the business of making commercial loans.
See alsoJust When Is a Bank Not a Bank. When It Is an Abomination, supra note 105.
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limits of the current regulatory structure. Merrill Lynch offers a complete line of financial services. 12 1 Sears, Roebuck has expanded beyond
its traditional retail sales business into insurance, real estate, investment
banking, and stock brokerage. 122 Shearson/American Express is involved in international banking.123 Prudential is established in both the
insurance and securities industries and, in addition, has established a
nonbank bank. 124 Many of these firms, even a few years ago, would not
have considered each other competitors.
As a result of these developments, interstate banking exists in all
but legal form. The definition of the kind of financial institution that is
"special" enough to be called a "bank" continues to be elusive, and the
multiplicity of financial marketplace regulators has become a
nightmare.
3. Overlapping RegulatoryJurzdictions.-Theinefficiency of the current
system of multiple regulators at the state and local levels has been exhaustively catalogued 1 25 and continues to increase. To a significant extent, this inefficiency is a result of the current system's proclivity for
treating similar products differently by regulating along institutional
rather than functional lines. For example, deposit-like services with
transaction capability offered by money market funds are regulated as
investment products under the Investment Company Act, and are therefore subject to rules which differ sharply from those applicable to banks
regarding advertising, 126 interstate operations, 2 7 association with certain types of business affiliates, 128 and reserve requirements.2 9 If bank
121. See Gart, The FinancialConglomerates, ECON. REV., May 1983, at 21. (published by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta). See generally McMurray, supra note 97.
122. A. GART, THE INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION 42-47
(1984).
123. See Gart, supra note 121, at 22.
124. Wallison, supra note 106.
125. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, CURRENCY AND HOUSING, 94TH CONG., IST
SESS., FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE NATION'S ECONOMY (FINE): DISCUSSION PRINCIPLES 11-14 (Comm. Print Nov. 1975).
126. 17 C.F.R. § 230.482 (1983). Both the Securities Act and the Investment Company
Act require extensive disclosure of pertinent information in advertisements to prospective investors in money market funds.
127. Unlike member banks of the Federal Reserve System, which are subject to the
McFadden Act, money market funds are not prohibited from engaging in interstate operations, subject to disclosure requirements.
128. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, § 17, 54 Stat. 789, 815-17
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1982)).
129. A difference in treatment exists with respect to the check redemption features of
money market funds and banks. While reserve requirements are imposed on transaction accounts offered by "depository institutions," 12 U.S.C. § 461(b) (1982), money market funds
are not viewed as depository institutions. Therefore, although the check redemption features
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brokerage activities are conducted by a bank holding company subsidiary, they are regulated by the SEC;' 0 if they are conducted by the bank
itself, they are exempt from SEC regulation and are regulated by the
bank regulators.' 1 Moreover, investment management activities by
banks, even if carried on pursuant to straightforward investment management agreements rather than trust arrangements, are exempt from
the Investment Advisers Act,' 3 2 and are regulated by the bank regulators. Identical arrangements by nonbanks are subject to the provisions
of the Investment Advisers Act.
An even more dramatic example of inconsistency is the disparate
treatment of commingled pension fund assets managed by banks and by
independent investment managers.' 33 It is generally accepted that the
efficient management of pension funds requires that the assets of more
than one fund be managed on a commingled basis. If that commingling
is done by an independent investment manager rather than by the trust
department of a bank, the result is an investment company subject to
registration and regulation under the Investment Company Act.13 4 Investment companies are subject to the advertising controls set forth in
the Securities Act, 1 35 the Securities Exchange Act, 1 3 6 and the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder by the SEC. 1 37 They are also sub-

of money market fund sponsored transaction accounts operate in a manner similar to transaction accounts offered by depository institutions, the Federal Reserve Board cannot impose
reserve requirements on the money market funds under existing law.
130. When banks and bank holding companies employ subsidiaries and affiliates to perform brokerage services, the exemptions from the federal securities laws applicable to banks
do not apply. Thus, the provisions of the Securities Act would apply to brokerage activities
conducted by a bank holding company subsidiary.
131. Banks remain exempt from the Securities Act. They are subject only to supervision
by the appropriate bank regulatory agencies. 15 U.S.C. § 78/(i) (1982). In 1974, the bank
regulatory agencies were directed to issue securities regulations for banks that were "substantially equivalent" to those issued by the SEC. Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500, 1503-04
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78/(i) (1982)).
132. Banks and bank holding companies are exempt from the definition of the term "investment adviser" set forth in the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a) (11) (1982).
Bank affiliates or subsidiaries, however, are not so exempt and are subject to the Investment
Advisers Act when they perform investment advisory services within the coverage of the Act.
133. While individual investment managers are subject to the provisions of the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1982), banks are expressly excluded from the
Act's coverage, id § 80a-3(c)(3).
134. Id. § 80a-3(a).
135. Id. § 7 7g.
136. Id. § 78j(b).
137. Rule lOb-5, promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, makes it "unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails" to make representations which are materially misleading "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
Rule 134, promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, permits specified items of
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ject to the terms of the Investment Company Act and the Investment
Advisers Act.
In contrast, bank common and collective trust funds are subject to
quite different regulatory treatment. The concept of a common trust
fund was first recognized in the Revenue Act of 1936, ' which established a tax exemption for bank common trust funds "maintained by a
bank . . . (1) exclusively for the collective investment and reinvestment
of moneys contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity as a trustee,
executor, . . . or guardian; and (2) in conformity with the rules and
regulations . . . of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System."' 3 9 Congress made it clear that the bank regulators were to assure
that bank common trust funds would not be "over-commercialized" or
used for "speculative purposes."'" In 1937, the Federal Reserve Board
adopted section 17 of Regulation F, authorizing national and state
member banks to establish common trust funds. 4 ' Section 17 expressly
provided that the new authority could not be used to promote commingled investment management services.' 42 The Federal Reserve Board
accompanied its strict limitations on the use of common trust funds with
43
equally strict prohibitions against bank advertising of such funds.'
Similar restrictions on the promotion of common trust funds have been
maintained by the Comptroller of the Currency through regulations
which flatly forbid advertising and only permit distributing copies of the
financial reports of common trust funds to persons who request them or
44
to prospective trust customers.
Additional examples of such overlapping and inconsistent jurisdic-

information to be included in investment company advertising without requiring that the
advertising be preceded or accompanied by a prospectus. Id. § 230.134.
Rule 156, promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, is interpretative in nature
and highlights the types of representations which the SEC's experience suggests are most
likely to be misleading. Id. § 230.156.
Rule 482, recently issued by the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933, further increases the flexibility and scope of investment company advertising by permitting investment
companies to publish a broader range of information than was previously permitted, through
the use of an "omitting prospectus." Id. § 230.482.
138. Ch. 690, § 169, 49 Stat. 1648, 1708 (codified at I.R.C. § 584 (1982)).
139. 49 Stat. at 1708.
140. Amendments to Regulation F, 2 Fed. Reg. 3440 (1937).
141. Id.
142. Section 17 states, in part, that "the operation of such common trust funds as investment trusts for other than strictly fiduciary purposes is hereby prohibited." Id.
143. Id.
144. The regulations of the Comptroller of the Currency do not permit a bank to advertise
its common trust fund service. A bank may indicate, however, that it has an annual report
available concerning its common trust fund activities in connection with the promotion of its
fiduciary services. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(5)(iv)-(v) (1983).
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tions are seen in the regulation of mutual funds, commodity futures
pools, stock options, and commodity futures options. Like mutual
funds, commodity futures pools are subject to the advertising and disclosure requirements of the Securities Act. Unlike mutual funds, however,
commodity futures pools are not subject to substantive regulation under
the Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act. Options on stocks are policed by the SEC, while options on commodity
futures are regulated by the CFTC.'4 5 Stock option investors get Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) protection, while commodity options purchasers have no insurance if a broker fails. 146 Margin
rules for financing options transactions are set by the Federal Reserve
Board, while margin rules for financing commodities transactions are set
by the boards of the futures exchanges.' 4 7
4. Demse of Glass-Steaga/l.-The crumbling of Glass-Steagall Act
barriers to investment activities by commercial banks has been well documented.' 4 8 Suffice it to say that the Congress, courts, and regulators
have permitted all of the following securities activities by banks or bank
holding company subsidiaries (some of which are currently the subject
of litigation):
-

underwriting and dealing in Treasury bonds and state
and local general obligation bonds;149
underwriting and dealing in many types of state and local
revenue bonds; 5 0

145. CFTC regulations relating to commodity option transactions are set forth at 17
C.F.R. § 32 (1983).
146. Stock option investors are protected by the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970,
15 U.S.C. § 78aaa (1982). Regulations for the protection of commodity options purchasers
are set forth at 12 C.F.R. § 166 (1983).
147. Compare Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. §§ 221.1-.4 (1983) (providing an example of margin
regulation by the Federal Reserve Board), with 17 C.F.R. § 1.30 (1983) (providing an example of margin regulation by the CFTC).
148. See, e.g., Pitt & Williams, supra note 89; Note, A Conduct-OrientedApproach to the GlassSteagallAct, 91 YALE L.J. 102 (1981).
149. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 1.3(g) (1983). The Glass-Steagall Act permits banks to underwrite general obligation bonds of state and local governments. Such bonds are backed by the
full faith and credit of a governmental body having general powers of taxation, including
property taxation.
150. Banks are prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act from underwriting bonds issued by a
state or municipality unless those bonds represent general obligations. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982).
Revenue bonds, unlike "general obligations" are not backed by the full resources and taxing
power of a governmental unit, but only by the resources of a particular revenue producing
project or separate source of funds. In the early 1960's, the Comptroller of the Currency
issued several rulings permitting national bank underwriting of state and municipal bonds
which were not backed by entities having general taxing powers. Investment Securities Regulation, Eligibility of Specific Bond Issues for Purchase by National Banks, 27 Fed. Reg. 6748-
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acting as financial adviser to issuers of state and local revenue bonds;"5 '
acting as a discount broker, and perhaps a full service bro152
ker, for corporate securities of all kinds;
underwriting and dealing in corporate securities of all
kinds outside the United States;' 5 3
acting as agent for corporations in arranging private
placements of debt and equity securities; 154
15
acting as broker for interest-rate futures contracts; 1

49 (1962). The Federal Reserve Board, on the other hand, disagreed with the comptroller's
interpretation and specifically prohibited state member banks from underwriting these types
of bonds. 12 C.F.R. § 250.120 (1983). In Baker, Watts & Co. v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247, 252
(D.D.C. 1966), affdsub nom. Port of N.Y. Auth. v. Baker, Watts &Co , 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir.
1968), the court followed the position taken by the Federal Reserve Board and held that
banks may only underwrite bonds which are backed by the full faith and credit of a governmental entity possessing general powers of taxation. However, as determined by both the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board, the bonds do not have to be
issued by such an entity, but only directly or indirectly backed by one. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1.120,
250.122 (1983); see also Eligibility of Securities for Purchase, Dealing in, Underwriting and
Holding by National Banks, 47 Fed. Reg. 5701, 5702-03 (1982) (comments). Moreover, 12
U.S.C. § 24 periodically has been amended to permit banks to underwrite and deal in certain
kinds of revenue bonds.
151. See, for example, the decision of the Supreme Court in Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 55 (1981). The Court characterized investment advisory activities as a facet of the traditional fiduciary functions of banks. Banks and bank holding
companies are exempt from the definition of the term "investment adviser" under the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(11) (1982).
152. Discount brokerage activities performed by banks or bank holding companies have
been determined not to violate the Glass-Steagall Act. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 716 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1983), affd, 104 S. Ct. 1905
(1984); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, [Current] FED. BANKING L.
REP. (CCH) $ 99,771 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 1983). The Comptroller of the Currency recently
authorized a combination of discount brokerage and traditional bank investment management services. Application of American National Bank of Austin, Texas, [Current] FED.
99,732 (Sept. 23, 1983).
BANKING L. REP. (CCH)
153. See generally Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, §§ 2(7), 5, 48 Stat. 74, 75, 77-78
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(7), e (1982)) (section 2(7) of the Act defines interstate commerce as including trade or commerce in securities between a state and any foreign
country; section 5 sets forth requirements to be met before securities can be traded or sold in
interstate commerce).
154. See generally The New York Clearinghouse Association, Commercial Bank Private Placement Advisory Services.- The Legal and Publi Policy Issues, 95 BANKING L.J. 333 (1978).
The Comptroller of the Currency has indicated that, in his opinion, "the proper legal
judgment is that Glass-Steagall does not prohibit private placement activity as presently conducted by commercial banks." Propriety of National Bank Private Placement Activity in Light of the
Glass-SteagallAct, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 85,107, at
77,103 (Dec. 9, 1978).
155. A recently promulgated federal regulation includes the following in a list of permissible nonbanking activities for bank holding companies and their subsidiaries:
Acting as a futures commission merchant for nonaffiliated persons in the execution
and clearance on major commodity exchanges of futures contracts and options on
futures contracts for bullion, foreign exchange, government securities, certificates of
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acting as investment manager for individuals, trusts,
pen5 6
sion funds, and investment companies of all kinds.'
Whatever legal analysis tells us about the correctness of the foregoing
judgments, it is plain that the Glass-Steagall Act has lost its moral force.
-

5

De Facto Interstate Banking.-(a) Banking Servzes.-As one observer

recently noted, "Although interstate banking is prohibited by the
McFadden Act and the Douglas Amendment, the fact is that banking
organizations are providing services across state lines and have been doing so for some time." '5 7 In non-retail banking, especially when conducted by the largest corporations in the United States, the "bars" to
interstate banking have little importance.1 58 One recent study found
that domestic banking organizations control at least 7383 interstate offices, and if interstate offices of foreign banking organizations are included, the total reaches 7840.'
Almost 1500 such interstate offices
supply general banking services. The Bank Holding Company Act allows bank holding companies to establish or acquire nonbank subsidiaries which provide lending and related services "closely related to
banking" that are not subject to the prohibitions on interstate banking." Moreover, loan production offices1 6 ' and nonbank subsidiaries
deposit and other money market instruments that a bank may buy or sell in the cash
market for its own account if [certain conditions are met].
49 Fed. Reg. 826, 828 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.25).
156. For example, pursuant to Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1983), and related interpretative rulings, the Federal Reserve Board has determined that a bank holding company may
act as an investment adviser for an open-end or closed-end investment company, and in addition, may organize, operate, or control a closed-end investment company. See 12 C.F.R.
§§ 225.4(a)(5), 225.125 (1983). In Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 78
(1981), the Supreme Court specifically upheld the Federal Reserve Board's regulation with
respect to advising closed-end companies.
157. Whitehead, Interstate Banking: Takzhg Inventory, ECON. REv., May 1983, at 4 (published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta).
158. See Brouillette, supra note 97, at 1; Fraust, Crossing State Lines, supra note 97, at 1;
Fraust, Banks Stake Out An Interstate Future, supra note 97, at 1.
159. Whitehead, supra note 157, at 18. Whitehead found a total of 55,440 banking offices
in the United States.
160. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982). The Bank Holding Company Act allows bank holding
companies to offer virtually any "bank-like" service, except the acceptance of deposits, on a
multi-state basis. Thus, bank holding companies have activated nationwide networks of consumer finance, mortgage banking, and other financial activities.
161. An interpretative ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency authorizes national banks
to operate "loan production offices" for the purpose of originating loans. The ruling states
that such offices will not be considered "branches" within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 36(f),
provided that the loans are approved and made at a main or branch office of the bank. 45
Fed. Reg. 53,080 (1980) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.7380 (1984)).
For a time, the future of loan production offices was in doubt. In 1979, the District
Court for the District of Columbia, holding that loan production offices constituted branch
banks under 12 U.S.C. § 36, ordered the Comptroller of the Currency to rescind its interpre-
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such as Edge Act corporations 62 allow banks to provide interstate financial services.
Even in the area of retail banking, deposit taking and consumer
lending functions present clear examples of the reality of interstate
1 63
banking. Banks accept deposits indirectly from all over the country.
Money market funds operate without concern for state boundaries when
they perform a commingling function for small account holders and
purchase large certificates of deposit (CDs) issued by banks." Moreover, securities firms have begun to market, through their nationwide
offices, the insured CDs of banks and savings institutions.165 The consumer lending function presents even clearer evidence of de facto interstate banking. The advent of credit card lending by bank owned
finance and mortgage companies represents a substantial penetration of
the consumer loan market throughout the country.
(b) Activites of States Promoting Interstate Bankig.--States have acted

directly to position themselves for, and promote the legalization of, interstate banking. Delaware, for example, passed its Financial Center
Development Act (FCDA) 6 6 in February 1981. The FCDA was Delaware's invitation to out-of-state banks to establish banking operations
within the state. It was premised on the Douglas Amendment's prohibition on interstate banking except in the case of express invitation by
state legislation. Its provisions included elimination of interest rate ceilings for banks, flexible credit provisions, and low rates of bank
taxation. 167

On December 30, 1982, Massachusetts enacted a law "6"permittative ruling. The following year, however, the district court's decision was reversed on appeal and the comptroller's interpretative ruling was reinstated. Independent Bankers Ass'n of
Am. v. Heimann, 627 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court of appeals reversed, not on the
merits, but because the IBAA had delayed bringing suit until 12 years after the interpretative
ruling was published and was therefore barred by laches. The court noted, however, that "we
have serious questions about" the district court's decision on the merits as well. Id. at 488.
162. So-called Edge Act corporations operate on a multi-state basis and offer both deposit
and loan services as long as they are confined to international trade and are available only for
that service to business customers. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-632 (1982). The International Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1982), substantially broadened the powers of Edge
Act corporations by authorizing the Federal Reserve Board to allow them to branch interstate and to broaden their operating flexibility.
163. See supra note 158.
164. Id.

165. Id.
166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 770 (Supp. 1982).

167. Ripsom, Swayze & Sheehan, A Review of Delaware Banking Developments, BANKING ExPANSION REP., Nov. 7, 1983, at 1, 13.

168. 1982 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 626 (Law. Co-op.) (codified in scattered sections of
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. chs. 167, 167A, 167B, 167C, 167E, 168, 170, 172 (West 1984)).
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ting depository institutions, or their holding companies, in any of the
five other New England states to merge with or acquire banks or thrift
institutions in Massachusetts, so long as the entering institution is in a
New England state that has enacted a reciprocal law permitting entry
by Massachusetts' financial institutions."16' 9 Connecticut and Rhode Island have also enacted regional reciprocity statutes, 7 ° which permit
bank holding companies in other New England states to acquire or create new in-state banks, provided that the home state of the out-of-state
bank holding company has a similar statute."' Although it has approved transactions based on reciprocity statutes, the Federal Reserve
Board has expressed concern about the development of regional interstate banking, observing that "there is a potential danger that the result
could be to divide the country into a number of banking regions." 172
(c) InterstateExpansion of Savings and Loan Associations.-Although there
is no statutory prohibition on interstate activities by savings and loan
associations, until recently the FHLBB prohibited such activities. The
need to find merger partners for failing thrift institutions, however, has
encouraged more flexibility on the part of the FHLBB. On August 16,
1982, the FHLBB announced that Fidelity Savings and Loan Association of Oakland, California (Fidelity), would be acquired by Citicorp."'
169. Golembe, Massachusetts and Interstate Banking, BANKING EXPANSION REP., Jan. 17,
1983, at 1.
Citicorp has challenged the Massachusetts statute and a similar Connecticut statute
on the grounds that they violate the contract, commerce, and supremacy clauses of the
United States Constitution. Memorandum of Citicorp in Opposition to the Application for
Approval to Merge, In re Application of Bank of New England Corp., Proceedings before the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Dec. 1983.
170. The Connecticut and Rhode Island statutes are located, respectively, at 1983 Conn.
Legis. Serv. 411 (West); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-30-2 (Supp. 1983).
171. Maine allows out-of-state bank holding companies to acquire in-state banks on essentially the same terms that apply to acquisitions by in-state holding companies. ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1013 (Supp. 1983). Three New England transactions based on regional
reciprocity statutes have been approved by the Federal Reserve Board: (1) Bank of New
England Corporation received approval to acquire CBT Corporation, 70 FED. RESERVE
BULL. 374 (1984); (2) Hartford National Corporation received approval to acquire Arltru
Bancorporation, 70 FED. RESERVE BULL. 353 (1984); and (3) Bank of Boston Corporation
received approval to acquire Colonial Bancorp of Connecticut, Federal Reserve Board decision of May 18, 1984, discussed in BANKING EXPANSION REP., June 4, 1984, at 2-3.
172. Federal Reserve Board decision, cited in BANKING EXPANSION REP., supra note 171; see
also 70 FED. RESERVE BULL. 374 (1984).
173. Order, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Aug. 16, 1982. The FHLBB had sought a
merger partner for Fidelity since April 1982, when Fidelity was put into FSLIC receivership
and bids were invited. Under the terms of the Citicorp bid that was approved, FSLIC assistance could amount to $165 million over the twelve-year term of the proposal, but would
decline to $50 million if short-term interest rates were to fall to less than 10%. Citicorp agreed
to provide enough equity capital to increase Fidelity's net worth to 3% of its liabilities and to
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The approval of the Federal Reserve Board also was required because
the acquisition fell under section 1843(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act. 17 4 The Federal Reserve Board issued its approval on September 28, 1982.'
In allowing Citicorp to acquire Fidelity, the first
instance of a cross-industry interstate merger, the Federal Reserve Board
said it took into account "the beneficial effect on the financial community as a whole of implementing an additional mechanism for the solution of difficult problems for the thrift industry and the federal
insurance funds posed by the poor earnings" of the thrift industry.1 76
Subsequently, the FHLBB proposed a rule to permit nonsupervisory interstate mergers, acquisitions, and branching when state laws specifically permit entry by out-of-state institutions. 7 7 The FHLBB
advocated a "host state" approach under which a federally-chartered
thrift could branch into a state, either by establishing a new office there
or by merging with an institution in the host state, provided that the
host state permitted state-chartered thrifts from other states to engage in
similar activities.
(d) InterstateExpansion of Nonbank Banks.-The possibility of acquiring
nonbank banks in a number of states to form an interstate organization
without regard to the strictures of the Douglas Amendment1 7 is the aspect of nonbank bank expansion which is most threatening to traditional regulatory patterns. Such networks of nonbank banks have the
potential to link brokerage, commercial, and industrial activities with
79
interstate deposit taking.
Dimension Financial Corporation (Dimension) provides a good
provide additional equity as needed to maintain that ratio. The FHLBB estimated Citicorp's
initial contribution at more than $80 million.
174. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
175. Citicorp, 68 FED. RESERVE BULL. 656 (1982).
176. This was, of course, a departure from established policy. In 1977, for example, in its
Order Denying Retention of Empire Savings, Building and Loan Association by D.H. Baldwin Company (cited in id. app.), the Federal Reserve Board identified three potential adverse
effects that could be expected to result from the affiliation of a bank and a savings and loan
association:
(a) a conflict between the statutory and regulatory frameworks within which such
banks and savings and loan associations operate;
(b) an erosion of institutional rivalry between banks and savings and loan associations; and
(c) a potential for undermining federal prohibitions against interstate banking.
63 FED. RESERVE BULL. 280 (1977).
177. Interstate Transactions Involving Insured Institutions, 48 Fed. Reg. 20,930 (1983) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 556.5, 563.22)(proposed May 10, 1983).
178. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
179. See Eisenbeis, Regional Forcesfor Interstate Banking, ECON. REV., May 1983, at 24 (published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta).
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example of the interstate expansion possibilities of nonbank banks. In
1983, Dimension announced plans to set up thirty-one consumer oriented nonbank banks in twenty-five states.'8 ° Since these banks would
not engage in commercial lending, and would therefore not constitute
"banks" within the meaning of the Bank Holding Company Act,'"' Dimension would not be subject to the interstate restrictions of the Douglas Amendment or the regulatory supervision of the Federal Reserve
Board. On May 9, 1984, the comptroller granted preliminary approval
to Dimension to organize four banks and gave Dimension thirty days to
designate which four banks it would organize. 8 2 The comptroller
stated that Dimension's "applications represent a sound banking concept . . . [which is] permissible under applicable federal statutes."' 3
Because Dimension had no operating history, however, the comptroller
reserved judgment on the remaining twenty-seven applications. Dimension will be permitted to renew its request for preliminary approvals of
additional banks only after the initial four banks have opened and have
8 4
established satisfactory operating records. '
III.

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT REGULATORY REFORM

Economic forces have thrust market participants into fierce competition. The rate of development of new financial products has been extraordinary, and as each new product forces itself through a real or
imagined loophole in the complex set of laws that govern financial institutions, regulators and the Congress are faced with the decision of
whether to permit the development or to intervene and stop it. The
enormous inertia retarding legislative change usually prompts a decision, by design or default, to do nothing.
A.

Sudies and Commissions

Part of the reason for this inertia is the uncomfortable feeling
among politicians and regulators that individual steps to restructure the
markets or the regulatory system should only be taken as part of an
overall plan. That notion was surely behind Congressman Timothy
Wirth's call for a Capital Markets Commission,' 8 5 SEC Chairman John
180. Am. Banker, Feb. 18, 1983, at 1;Wall St. J., Feb. 18, 1983, at 6, col. 3.
181. See supra note 105.
182. Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Applications of Dimension Financial Corporation to Charter Thirty-One National Banks in Twenty-Five States (May 9, 1984),
reprintedth 42 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) 815 (May 14, 1984).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. In August 1982, Representative Timothy Wirth introduced legislation to establish a
Capital Markets Commission to study and evaluate the nation's long-term capital require-
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Shad's proposal to simplify and rationalize regulation of financial services,"8 6 and the Reagan administration's more limited step in appointing
the Bush Task Group."8 7
The preference for studying the big picture is not surprising, nor is
it new. 188 Previous efforts to review the regulation of financial institutions have been more or less systematic attempts to look at what was

ments and to determine what changes might be needed in federal and state financial policies
to meet these requirements. The Capital Markets Commission was to have been charged
with four primary functions:
I. Examination of the capital needs of the United States economy to sustain short-term and long-term economic growth, by business sector and geographic
region;
2. Examination of the ability of financial intermediaries to raise and allocate such capital;
3. Analysis of the impact of federal and state laws and policies on such
matters as the fairness and efficiency of capital allocation, the fairness of competition between such intermediaries, and the impact of differences in regulation over
intermediaries offering similar instruments and products; and
4. Assessment of the safety and soundness of financial intermediaries.
H.R. 7014, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
186. On February 4, 1982, Chairman John Shad of the SEC proposed a program to simplify and rationalize regulation of financial services. The SEC program would begin with the
appointment of a nonpartisan task force of experienced executives and authorities who would
study the possibility of regulating certain products and activities by functions rather than by
"outmoded industry classifications." The task force would consider consolidation of related
regulatory activities with a view toward reducing conflicts and administrative costs and increasing operational efficiency and financial flexibility. SEC Proposes Five-Point Program to Reform FnancialServices Regulation, 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 251 (Feb. 10, 1982).
187. In its request for public comments on the problems and possible reorganization of the
existing system of federal regulation of financial institutions and services, the Bush Task
Group cited a number of reform issues and options, including: (a) the reorganization of depository regulators; (b) the possible reorganization, consolidation, or coordination of issues
among agencies dealing with securities trading, commodity futures trading, and depository
institutions; (c) the possible consolidation of the three federal deposit insurance agencies and
the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC); and (d) the extent to which current
regulatory or statutory restrictions on financial institutions or their holding companies should
be eliminated or modified. 48 Fed. Reg. 5704 (1983).
188. The sheer number of studies which have considered banking regulation is impressive.
Prominent studies include: FinancialInstitutions Supervisoiy Act of 1966- Hearings on S 3158
Before the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966); Consolidation of Bank Examining andSupervisoy Functions.- Hearingson H.R. 107 and
HR. 6885 Before the Subcomm. on Bank Supervision and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Confi'ct of Federaland State Banking Laws. Hearings Before
the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); Proposed FederalBanking
Commission and Federal Deposit and Savings Insurance Board- Hearings on HR. 729 and HR. 5874
Before the Subcomm. on Banking Supervision and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); IncreasedFlexibilityfor FinancialInstitutions.- Hearingson H.R. 5845,
HR. 7878, HR. 8230, H.R. 8245, H.R. 8247, H.R. 8459, and HR. 8541 Before the House Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); Review of the Report of the Commission on
Money and Credit. Hearings Before the Joint Economic Comm., 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); COMM.
ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1963).
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perceived as the "whole" of the regulatory structure. In 1962, for example, the Advisory Committee on Banking to the Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller's Committee) recommended that the Federal
Reserve Board's bank supervisory powers be terminated and that supervisory authority relating to national banks be transferred entirely to the
Comptroller of the Currency." 9 All authority relating to state banks
would have been transferred to the FDIC, and the FDIC was to be reorganized and placed under the control of a single administrator within
the Treasury Department. The Comptroller's Committee also suggested
that authority over the formation and expansion of bank holding companies be transferred from the Federal Reserve Board to the Comptroller of the Currency, and that the Federal Reserve Board's authority to
set margin requirements and deposit interest rates be transferred to the
Secretary of the Treasury. Furthermore, the authority of the Federal
Reserve Board and the FDIC to regulate branches of state banks was to
be relinquished to the respective state bank supervisory agencies. 19°
In 1971, the Hunt Commission, bowing to the political power of
state bank regulators, recommended establishing three new agencies:
the Office of the National Bank Administrator, which would have the
supervisory responsibilities of the Comptroller of the Currency with respect to national banks and would be an agency independent of the
Treasury Department; the Office of the Administrator of State Banks,
which would assume the examination and supervision responsibilities
for state-chartered insured commercial and mutual savings banks currently exercised by the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC; and the
Federal Deposit Guarantee Administration, which would incorporate
under its umbrella the FDIC, the FSLIC, and the Credit Union Insurance Corporation (CUIC). 9 ' The Federal Reserve Board would have
retained its authority to implement monetary policy and administer the
92
Bank Holding Company Act.1
In 1975, a study commissioned by the House Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing (commonly referred to as the "FINE
Study") recommended creating a single supervisory agency, the Federal
Depository Institutions Commission, which was to administer all supervisory functions of the FDIC, the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptrol-

189.

ADVISORY
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BANKS AND THE FUTURE

190. Id.
191. U.S.
87-92 (1971).
192. Id.
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138 (1962).
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ler of the Currency, the FHLBB, and the NCUA.' 9 3 A subsidiary
agency of the Federal Depository Institutions Commission would have
handled insurance functions. 194
B,

The Problem With Shiftbig Boxes On Organ'zationalCharts

The problem with all of the foregoing efforts at regulatory restructuring is that they attempt to find a new congruence between financial
institutions and existing regulators. That task requires a prescience
about the ultimate shape of the financial industry that is simply beyond
the powers of government planners and advisers, even the blue-ribbon
variety. Instead, there must be a fundamental rethinking of regulatory
patterns designed to match the financial functions which are to be regulated. In an era dominated by cross-industry financial institutions and
products, there is no justification for the regulation of similar functions
by different regulators, each operating with distinct substantive and procedural regulations, rules, and standards.
It is time to confront the regulatory anomalies, develop a new taxonomy of the functions performed in the financial marketplace, and devise a new structure for regulating those functions.' 95 The creation of a
new model-a new paradigm- should be the goal. In creating this new
paradigm it may be necessary to discard much of the accumulated regulatory baggage that often has obstructed the vision of those who have
previously confronted the problem. As Stephen Toulmin said, "There is
only one way of seeing one's own spectacles clearly: that is, to take them
off. It is impossible to focus both on them and through them at the same
time.' 1 96 It is time to place the data in a new system of relations and
provide a new framework for analysis.' 9 7

IV.
A.

REGULATORY OBJECTIVES

A Need to Ask Fundamental Questions

The essential task in the creation of a new paradigm for regulating
financial functions and institutions is to identify the regulatory values or
goals that have contemporary significance and to design a system that
facilitates achievement of these goals. The task must begin with a determination of objectives, proceed to an examination of the alternative
193. See supra note 125, at 12.
194. Id.
195. Cf T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
("Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly
196. S. TOULMIN, FORESIGHT AND UNDERSTANDING
197. Cf H. BUTrERFIELD, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN
1957).

REVOLUTIONS 52-53 (2d ed. 1970)

.... ).
101 (1961).
SCIENCE 1300-1800, at 1-7 (rev. ed.
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methods of attaining those objectives, and culminate with the choice of
an operating plan. 9 ' Although that is not an easy undertaking, the
very attempt should advance the cause of facilitating more effective and
efficient regulation of financial institutions.
B.

Goals of Regulation

The goals that must be achieved by a regulatory system for the
financial services industry can be summarized as follows: efficiency of
regulation, flexibility, fair dealing, safety and soundness, avoidance of
concentration, and efficient implementation of monetary policy. 199
I. Efficzenc.-Arthur Okun states in Equality and Eafez'ncy,"° that
"The government must be accountable to the citizens, [but] accountability is as costly in regources as it is precious to the integrity of the
political process." 2 °1 Efficiency of regulation is achieved when financial
regulators and regulations distort the behavior of market participants
only to the extent required to achieve valid public policy goals. Inconsistent, duplicative rules affecting identical financial functions and imposed by different government agencies cause private sector marketing
efforts, and therefore capital flows, to be affected by differences in regulatory philosophy rather than by considerations of economic efficiency
and equality. Quintessential examples of such inefficiency are the open
warfare between the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board on the "nonbank bank" issue2 2 and the differences in regulation of stock index options and stock index futures, which fall under
the respective jurisdictions of the SEC and the CFTC.
When a system is based upon inconsistent rules, the mix between
regulation and free market activity is sub-optimal. To the extent that
the problem is due to overlapping regulatory jurisdiction, as is often the
case in the financial marketplace, greater efficiency would be achieved
through consolidation of functionally similar regulatory responsibilities.
In making the following suggestions, we do not ignore the formidable political barriers to their implementation. We are not so naive as to
suggest that legislative programs embodying these proposals in their en198. Breyer, Ana~zing Regulatogy Failure. Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform,
92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 550 (1979).
199. For a summary of traditional goals of financial regulation, see Chase, The Structure of

Federal Regulation of Depositogy Institutions, in HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, CURRENCY AND
HOUSING, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE NATION'S ECONOMY:

COMPENDIUM OF PA-

PERS PREPARED FOR THE FINE STUDY 149 (Comm. Print 1976).
200. A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADE-OFF (1975).
201. Id.at 60.

202. See supra note 105.

19841

FINANCIAL REGULATION

tirety would have any substantial likelihood of immediate success. But
individual decisions that, in the aggregate, shape the financial system
are being made all the time as part of the ongoing process of political
compromise, and we view these proposals as lodestars to guide such decisions and to fix the direction in which the systems should evolve.
The starting point for consolidation efforts should be the transfer of
primary responsibility for regulating larger state and national banks and
bank holding companies to a single regulator. These institutions compete in the same markets and should be subject not only to the same
rules but also to the same set of regulatory attitudes. There are many
persons and institutions, of course, who defend the current panoply of
multiple regulators on the grounds that it avoids the consequences of
monolithic power, provides a competitive counterweight to the heavy
hand of regulation, and allows greater opportunity for experimentation. °3 Such arguments have some appeal. There are surely times, of
which the present is one, when one regulator prefers to push forward
faster than others and thus leads in developing new approaches to systemic problems.
But competition among regulators may work to retard change as
well as to implement it. To some extent, the very process of competition
among the regulators makes the regulatory system nonadaptive and unpredictable and thereby also inhibits efficiency. Many changes cannot,
as a practical matter, be made without the concurrence of all regulators.
In those cases, any one agency effectively can veto change. Moreover,
even when all regulators are in concurrence, change may be imposed in
an uncoordinated manner without regard for the interests of competing
financial institutions. For example, in the 1970's the regulators were
agonizingly slow to identify the need to phase out deposit interest rate
controls, but in the 1980's, those controls were dropped abruptly.
In comparison, the advantages that might be derived from a centralized regulatory authority are considerable. 2 4 A single regulator
would eliminate conflicting goals, achieve greater efficiency and economy of regulation, and eliminate actual or potential policy conflicts between agencies. 0 5 Such an approach would simplify administration
and improve communication both within the regulator itself and be-

203. See, e.g., Letter from Herbert W. Gray, Chairman of the National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, to Bush Task Group (Mar. 14, 1983).
204. For a listing of unification proposals, see Hackley, Our Baffing Banking System--Part If,
52 VA. L. REV. 771, 799-830 (1966). See also Chase, supra note 199, at 149-64; Robertson,
FederalRegulation of Banking." A Pleafor Unifwation, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 686-95
(1966).
205. Robertson, supra note 204, at 687.
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tween financial institutions and the regulator. A single regulator would
also reduce uneven application of identical federal statutes to different
financial institutions, and would facilitate prompt adjustment of regulation to changes in the financial markets.
The next step should be to consolidate regulation of different kinds
of depository institutions. Surely the safety and soundness, monetary
policy, and competitive equality considerations applicable to large savings institutions do not differ materially from those applicable to many
large banks. Although there are differences in asset and liability powers
between banks and savings and loan associations, and the mortgagecredit allocation functions of savings and loan associations are not applicable to banks, those differences do not reduce the desirability of uniform regulation.
As a complementary step toward rationality, the jurisdiction of the
SEC and CFTC over derivative investment products should be consolidated. Just as banks and savings and loan associations are offering essentially interchangeable products to retail depositors and home
mortgage borrowers, broker-dealers and futures commission merchants
are offering similar products to the public.
Considerations of efficiency have implications for the development
of substantive as well as jurisdictional rules for regulatory agencies. The
money market fund phenomenon, the expanded powers of thrift institutions, and the evolution of new insurance products have caused a substantial portion of the transaction account deposit base to be transferred
outside the commercial banking system.20 6 Because investment managers of money market funds, savings and loan associations, and insurance
companies are not subject to the Glass-Steagall Act,20 7 considerations of
efficiency led to the union of corporate affiliates engaged in traditional
banking functions, such as deposit taking and consumer loans, with
other affiliates engaged in investment banking. If investment banking
has not proven dangerous for these depository institutions, then the underlying premise of the Glass-Steagall Act, that association with invest-

206. See, e.g., LaFalce, Banking in the Eighties, 37 Bus. LAw. 839 (1982) (discussion of growth
in assets of money market funds). The authorization for savings and loan associations to
engage in new demand deposit activities is set forth at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(1)(A) (1982).
207. See also the proposal of the FDIC to allow state nonmember banks to engage in
securities activities. Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practices, 48 Fed. Reg. 22,155 (1983) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 337)(proposed May 17, 1983). The basis of the FDIC's proposal is
a determination that "it is not unlawful under the Glass-Steagall Act for an insured nonmember bank to establish or acquire a bona fide subsidiary [engaging] in securities activities nor
for an insured nonmember bank to become affiliated with a company engaged in securities
activities." Id.
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20 8
ment banking is dangerous for banks, would seem to be mistaken.

2. Flexibih'y.-Flexibility in regulation is the ability of a regulatory
system to adapt to changes in the regulated industry without distorting
the regulatory system, the industry, or the marketplace generally. The
goal of regulatory flexibility extends beyond regulatory efficiency, responsiveness, and innovation, and includes the desirability of permitting
market participants to respond to competitive forces in the most efficient
way. The lack of flexibility is the major problem in financial regulation
today and the need for flexibility is the basis of the desire for functional
regulation.
As we noted earlier, the fundamental premise of the current system
is that there are different kinds of financial institutions that perform different functions and therefore ought to have different regulators. That
premise is no longer valid. Virtually all large financial institutions today think of themselves as, at least in part, in the business of providing
investment management services to their customers. Some of those services have special characteristics, such as transaction powers, that carry
special regulatory implications, but the fact remains that they are all
competing for the same retail savings dollar by offering similar services.
One can see this development clearly in adaptive reorganizations at
major banks aimed at combining all services rendered to individuals,
including "banking," "investment management," and recently, "brokerage," into self-contained personal banking groups.2 °9
3. Faimess.-The objective of dealing fairly with investors and depositors seems almost too obvious to include in a list of regulatory goals.
One need not look far, however, to realize what a minor role fairness has
played in the development of our current system.2 " Fairness to all consumers buying similar financial products requires that comparable rules
be applied regardless of the nature of the institutions providing the
products.
. Safety andSoundness.-There is no more important or difficult part
of the debate over the shape of the future regulatory structure than a
discussion of the need to provide safety and soundness. 2 t' Nor is there
208. The simple fact is that the Glass-Steagall Act was a response to particular historical
conditions. See, e.g., J. BROOKS, ONCE IN GOLCONDA: A TRUE DRAMA OF WALL STREET
1920-1938, at 149 (1969).
209. See, e.g., Brinson, First Chicago'sReorganizationPresents Opportunitiesfor Investment Management Group, 122 TR. & EST., June 1983, at 46.
210. See, e.g., supra notes 126-47 and accompanying text.
211. For a thorough discussion of the rationale behind solvency regulation and some
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any other aspect of the debate in which the depth of contemporary understanding seems so inadequate. Discussions of this issue frequently fail
to distinguish between several discrete concepts that are best considered
individually.
First, it is essential to be clear about which questions present true
safety and soundness issues and which questions merely echo parochial
interests. For example, the underwriting of corporate securities may expose bank capital to new risks; managing mutual funds does not.
Second, it is important to understand the link between protecting
individual depositors and protecting the financial system itself. From
the perspective of financial institutions, safety and soundness considerations mean that a regulatory system should prevent institutional failures
when harm to the financial marketplace would result. In theory, that
goal is achieved by protecting small depositors with deposit insurance
and permitting market forces to govern the flow of large, uninsured deposits. In practice, however, large banks have become so dependent
upon uninsured deposits that the "confidence" of the uninsured, institutional investor has provided the link between deposits at an individual
bank and the stability of the financial system as a whole. The travails of
Continental Illinois have made that clear.2 12 Indeed, uninsured deposits
are the most volatile because they are controlled by professionals and
because they are so large their withdrawal tends to have the greatest
impact on the financial system. Thus, in practice, the FDIC has been
compelled to operate the system to protect uninsured as well as insured
deposits.2 1 3
The SEC has been taking steps to encourage a higher level of disclosure of problem loans by bank holding companies 214 in the belief that
continuous disclosure will reduce the "run on the bank" effect of a sudden disclosure of serious problems. In turn, the FDIC has considered
experimenting with variable, risk-related premiums for deposit insur-

alternative regulatory approaches, see Edwards & Scott, Regulating the Solvency of Depsitogy
Institutions: A Perspectiefor Deregulation,in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 65 (F. Edwards
ed. 1979).
212. See generaly ContinentalRequires Large Capital Infusion, With or Without FDICHelp, 42
WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) 1022 (June 18, 1984).
213. See, e.g., Regulators, Banks Put Together Rescue Packagefor ContinentalBank, 42 WASH. FIN.
REP. (BNA) 847 (May 21, 1984). As part of the financial assistance package to Continental
Illinois, the FDIC gave its assurance that "all depositors and other general creditors of the
bank will be fully protected and service to the bank's customers will not be interrupted." Id.
214. See, e.g., Final SEC Amendment to Guidelines on Bank Holding Company Disclosures, [July-

Dec.] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 33, at 1629 (Aug. 19, 1983); see also Slater, New Disclosure Rules Worry Lenders, Am. Banker, Nov. 3, 1983, at 1, 3; McCue, Groups Speak Out Against
Revision of Disclosure Rules, Am. Banker, July 26, 1983, at 3.
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ance. 21 5 It is doubtful that either approach can cope with problems of
the scale of Continental Illinois.
Third, it is important to assess the effect deregulation has had on
the soundness of the banking industry. Industry officials predict that
the problems of Continental Illinois will cause Congress to move slowly
on deregulation.21 6 Yet it is clear that when major banks have found
themselves in trouble in recent years, it has been because of traditional
banking activities-real estate loans, 21 7 energy loans, 2 18 loans to developing countries, 2 ' 9 and government securities activities22°0 not because
of securities transactions or other exotic activities. It is true that the
deregulation of deposit interest rates22 ' has made the business of asset
and liability management much more complicated and difficult, but
that, after all, is the traditional business of banking. While it may be
possible to regulate that traditional business more closely and effectively, it is doubtful that government scrutiny can fully protect against
bad business judgment. Perhaps, for that reason, the current thinking of
bank regulators has been to increase capital requirements to create a
222
larger cushion against losses.
Fourth, significant questions exist regarding the advisability of insurance for nonbank financial institutions. Insurance is currently provided for savings institutions, securities firms, and many insurance

215. See FDIC'sProposed Legislaton to Improve Deposit Insurance System, and FDICAnalyss, 42
WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) 925 (May 28, 1984) (text and FDIC's analysis of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Improvements Act of 1984, S. 2699, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.). Section 6 of this bill
amends section 7(d) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. § 1817 (1982)) to give
the FDIC flexibility in setting the assessment credits returned to insured banks by basing the
credits on the risks the banks present to the Permanent Insurance Fund.
216. ContinentalIllinois Changes Legislation Outlook, BANKING EXPANSION REP., June 4, 1984,
at 14; Ferris, The Aftermath of Continental, Am. Banker, Aug. 13, 1984, at 1; Rose, Assessing
Continental's Costs, Am. Banker, July 30, 1984, at 1.
217. See, e.g., Ross, Nation's Largest REIT Defaults on Due Notes, The Washington Post, May
6, 1978, at E2, col. 4; see also Canada Bank Gets Fed Approval to Buy Up Westlands, Am. Banker,
June 14, 1984, at 30.
218. See, e.g., Three ContinentalExecs Violated Bank Ethics Code in Oil Deals,Am. Banker, Feb.
14, 1984, at 3.
219. See, e.g., Strict US Ruling to Slash Profits of Banks That Lent to Argentina, N.Y. Times,
June 19, 1984, at A1, col. 1; Carrington & Hertzberg, FinancialInstitutions are Showing the Strain
of a Decade of Turmoil, Wall St. J., Sept. 5, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
220. See, e.g., Chase's Battle to Catch Up, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 9, 1984, at 74.
221. The Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C. § 3503 (1982), authorized a phase out of the ceilings on the maximum rates of interest and dividends that
could be paid on deposits.
222. See Fed Proposes New Capital Guidelines in Break From FDIC and OCCActions, 43 WASH.
FIN. REP. (BNA) 168 (July 30, 1984); FDICProposes Alandatoy CapitalRuley Fed and OCC Erpectedto Follow, 43 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) 97 (July 16, 1984); Minmum CapitalStandardForAll
Banks Under Considerationby FDIC,42 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) 794 (May 15, 1984).
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companies, 223 although the insurance system for insurance companies is
inadequate. It is clear that the failure of firms other than depository
institutions can have a major effect on the financial markets. The impact of the collapse of Penn Central on the commercial paper market
and of the attempt of Hunt family interests to corner the silver market225a
2 24
The matter of brokered deposits,
few years ago are good examples.
which has pitted brokers, as well as the securities industry generally,
against the FDIC and the FHLBB, is a good example of the consequences of a fragmented approach to safety and soundness issues. The
FDIC and the FHLBB issued rules that would have limited the insurance coverage afforded deposits placed by or through a broker with an
insured bank or savings and loan association to $100,000 per deposit
broker.22 6 Subsequently, a federal judge declared these rules to be "unlawful and void" and stated that the FDIC and the FHLBB lacked au22 7
thority to deny or limit insurance to particular categories of deposits.
Finally, the effectiveness of dealing with risky activities by isolating
them in separate subsidiaries of bank holding companies must be carefully assessed. While there are some regulatory benefits to be derived
from this approach, in the end it is merely an attempt to substitute procedure for substance. 228 Separate subsidiaries will not fully isolate financial intermediaries from the more risky activities of the holding

223. The roles of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) and of various
state funds to protect policyholders in the event of insurance company failure are not as wellpublicized as those of the FDIC and FSLIC.
224. As William M. Isaac notes in Who ShouldSupervise the Banks?,Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 1984,
at 22, col. 3, the silver market collapse and the Penn Central bankruptcy are often cited by
the Federal Reserve Board in support of its argument that it must be given "adequate leverage in shaping the system" if it is to be called upon to "pick up the pieces in a financial crisis."
225. See generally FDICAdopts BrokeredDeposit Rule,- Calls Senate Provision Ineffective, 43 WASH.
FIN. REP. (BNA) 29 (July 9, 1984) (discussing the FDIC regulation that requires banks to
report deposits received from money brokers or other federally insured depository institutions); Legislation To Curb Brokered Deposits Regulations Introduced, 42 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA)
901 (May 28, 1984) (discussing bills introduced in Congress to limit the amount of short-term
brokered deposits that a federally insured depository institution may accept).
226. The proposed rules were set forth at 49 Fed. Reg. 2787 (1984) (proposed Jan. 23,
1984).
227. Judge Overturns U.S Order Meant to End FederalInsurancefor BrokeredDeposits, Wall St. J.,
June 21, 1984, at 2, col. 3.
228. Professor Robert C. Clark has suggested that:
The most basic reason for the separation theme [is that,] absent countervailing considerations, intermediary businesses ought to be kept separate from other lines of
business in order to facilitate the regulators' task of achieving soundness. Regulators
can create cheaper, simpler, and more uniform reporting and recordkeeping requirements, accounting rules, examination procedures, and substantive risk-related
rules if they do not have to contend with the possible impact on the intermediary
business of other operations of the regulated entity.
Clark, The Regulation of FinancialHolding Companies, 92 HARV. L. REV. 789, 815 (1979).
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company affiliates. In the event of the bankruptcy of a complex company, the use of separate subsidiaries does not necessarily protect individual units or subsidiaries from the effect of financial problems
elsewhere in the company-especially when public confidence in the intermediary is an essential element of each unit's viability. A recent example is the impact of adverse publicity about the problems of BaldwinUnited Corporation on the level of sales and redemptions of Single Premium Deferred Annuities issued by its life insurance subsidiaries. 2 9
5. Avoiding Concentration of Power.-Yet another regulatory goal is
avoiding excessive concentration of power within a small group of financial institutions. To some extent this goal reflects the populist distrust of
the power of large banks which underlies many of the debates about
deregulation of financial markets. We are not entirely free, of course, to
choose the size of our financial institutions. They compete in worldwide
markets and the players in those markets are very large indeed.23 ° In
any case, the size of financial institutions is less important than the
maintenance of the competition which results from broad access to financial services and to sources of credit. Regulation along functional
lines will not reduce such competition and may well have the opposite
effect. The more flexibility institutions have in offering different kinds
of services to capital suppliers, the more vigorous should be the competition for that capital.
In raising capital, the business of underwriting corporate securities
has become significantly concentrated in terms of dollar volume, with
the top five firms accounting for over seventy percent of the business. 23 ,
Under rule 415 and other developments, that business has come to require large amounts of capital, thereby placing smaller investment firms

229. Baldwin-Unitedis Now FacingDebenture Woe, Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1983, at 6, col. 1; How
Baldwin-UnitedExpanded/am Pianos to Finance to Trouble, Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
230. As of March 31, 1984, Citicorp had assets of $141.8 billion; BankAmerica, $121.5
billion; Chase Manhattan, $81.8 billion; Manufacturers Hanover, $64.8 billion; and J.P.
Morgan, $59.8 billion. WorldBankingSurvey.- Part1, Financial Times, May 21, 1984, § III, at
VIII, col. 6 table (U.S. Banking: First Quarter, 1984). As of the quarter ending January 31,
1984, the Royal Bank of Canada had assets of C$83.5 billion and the Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce had assets of C$68.0 billion. Id at IX, col. 2 table, (Performance of Five
Major Canadian Banks). As of December 31, 1983, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale had balance sheet assets of DM 210.0 billion, DM
160.8 billion, and DM 139.4 billion, respectively. West Germany: Banking, Finance and Investment, Financial Times, July 5, 1984, § IV, at II, cal. 1 table, (Top 10 West German Banks).
231. Salomon Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Goldman Sachs occupied the top three underwriting positions in fiscal 1983 both in dollar volume and in number of issues, and all three
were among the five most heavily capitalized investment banking firms. Super League Starts to
Stretch Away, Financial Times, June 4, 1984, § III, at VII, col. 1.
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at a competitive disadvantage.2 3' The addition of large commercial
banks as competitors for investment banking firms might well, therefore,
be pro-competitive. As for the availability of bank credit, there is little
evidence of increasing concentration. There is vigorous international
competition for the business of large borrowers, and the number of different kinds of lenders serving the retail credit market continues to
multiply.
6 Implementation of Monetay Policy.-Finally, any regulatory system
must preserve the Federal Reserve Board's authority and ability to implement monetary policy. 3 3 That should not require the whole deposit
base to be put back in "banks," but we must ensure that changes do not
make an already inexact process more difficult.
V.

FUNCTIONAL REGULATION

Regulation by institutional type, historically viewed as a simpler
and more effective regulatory paradigm than functional regulation, is
an approach that worked reasonably well only as long as one could
readily distinguish between banks, insurance companies, investment
companies, and other financial institutions. If clear and meaningful distinctions along institutional lines can be drawn, then powerful considerations-especially the ease of defining an agency's jurisdiction and of
determining the applicability of its rules and regulations-favor regulation by institutional type. Today, however, banks, insurance companies,
investment companies, and securities firms often perform similar functions and promote similar products.
In this setting, functional regulation provides a mechanism both for
creating a "level playing field" for entities performing similar functions,
and for achieving the regulatory goals discussed above. As Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker emphasized before the Senate Banking
Committee during its consideration of the legislation that eventually
was enacted as the Garn-St.Germain Act, "[i]nstitutions providing the
same services should be subject to substantially the same regulations in
providing these services, regardless of their form of organization. A
number of the distortions and inequities in financial markets today result from failure to adhere to this principle."2'34
There are six primary financial service functions which should be
232. Id.
233. For an excellent discussion of the Federal Reserve's functions in the implementation
of monetary policy, see generally P. MEEK, U.S. MONETARY POLICY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS (1982).
234. FinancialInstitutions Restructuring and Services Act of 1981: Hearingson S. 1720 Before the
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regulated by similar rules regardless of the type of financial institution
performing the functions. They are sales, investment management,
intermediation, custodial services, market activity, and lending. As the
discussion below suggests, uniformity of treatment is far more attainable
with some functions than with others.
A.

Sales

As bank accounts, mutual funds, annuities, and other financial
products come to compete in the same maturity spectrums for the same
retail savings dollars, the argument for subjecting the marketing of those
products to uniform regulation becomes quite strong. Regulation of the
sales function should address two issues: adequate disclosure by issuers,
and fairness by brokers and other financial services marketing personnel.
1. The Role ofDisclosure.-Historically,banks have not been required
to disclose material facts about their financial condition to retail depositors because deposit insurance removed any "investment" aspect of the
deposit instruments. There is surely a positive value in maintaining a
system in which individual depositors do not feel compelled to make
investment decisions about their short-term balances. The protection
offered by deposit insurance has allowed the individual to place modest
resources in the financial marketplace without the need for informed
credit analysis.
Individual accounts and CDs of less than $100,000, however, are
becoming an increasingly less significant portion of the liabilities of
large commercial banks. Large financial institutions have come to rely
primarily on purchased funds, including the sale of large CDs in the
United States and Eurodollar capital markets, and on repurchase agreements, federal funds, and the like.2 35 Such instruments, regardless of
their term, are nothing more than debt securities and, in principle, there
seems to be no reason why the issuers and secondary markets should be
subject to a different set of disclosure requirements than those applicable
to nonbank issuers of debt securities.
Traditionally, it has been argued that the federal government cannot permit a major bank to fail because of the degree of economic interdependence in the financial system, and that accordingly, the credit of
the United States stands behind all depositors, large and small.236 Thus,
it has been said, there is no need for a system of continuous disclosure
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 443, 450 (1981) (prepared
statement of Paul Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
235. M. STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET 68-69 (rev. ed. 1983).
236. See generally Edwards & Scott, supra note 211.
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because even the purchasers of uninsured CDs were protected. That
approach seems to have been borne out by the response of the federal
government to the disclosure of huge problem loans at Continental
2 37
Illinois.
Another traditional reason for nondisclosure has been the avoidance of "runs on the bank" which could result from disclosure of adverse
events. But there has been increasing skepticism about the continuing
value of the nondisclosure approach in the case of large commercial
banks. This skepticism appears to be shared by the Federal Reserve
Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, and the SEC.23 8
Certainly, the Continental Illinois experience has shown that delaying disclosure does not prevent runs on the bank-and the delay may
make the final "shock loss" even worse.2" 9 Continential Illinois represented a serious failure of the regulatory system for which there may be
no real solution. There was an extraordinary accumulation of bad
loans, perhaps in the area of $5 billion, and the resulting run on the
bank was quite serious. If large depositors had not been promised full
protection, the impact of withdrawals could have been disastrous.24 ° In
the end, there were no acceptable ready purchasers for the bank, and,
therefore, a huge federal equity investment was required. 2 4 '
Prior to the problems at Continental Illinois, and in response to
concerns about disclosure relating to rescheduling and possible default
on commercial debt owed to financial institutions by foreign countries,
the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the
FDIC jointly proposed a five-point program of regulation.2 4 2 That pro-

237. See Regulators, Banks PAt Together Rescue Package For Continental Bank, 42 WASH. FIN.
(BNA) 847, 847 (May 21, 1984).
238. See, e.g., Proposed Revision of Industry Guide Disclosures for Bank Holding Companies, 48 Fed. Reg. 18,826 (1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 231, 241) (proposed Apr. 26,
1983).
239. See generaly Treat Small Banks, Continental Sinilarly, Am. Banker, May 31, 1984, at 4
(run on Continental Illinois followed FDIC's announcement of a "modified payoff" policy).
240. In September 1984, Comptroller of the Currency C.T. Conover testified before Congress that, had the federal government not interceded to prevent Continental's failure, "we
would have seen a national, if not an international, financial crisis. The dimensions were
difficult to imagine. None of us wanted to find out." ContinentalJeopardizedMany Banks, The
Washington Post, Sept. 20, 1984, at Dl, col. 2.
241. The assistance package to Continental Illinois included "an immediate infusion of $2
billion in capital in the form of subordinated debt from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and a group of commercial banks." Regulators, Banks Put Together Rescue Packagefor
ContinentalBank, supra note 237, at 847. A standby facility of $5.3 billion was also arranged
through a consortium of 24 major banks. Id.
242. FEDERAL RESERVE, FDIC, & COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, JOINT MEMORANREP.

DUM:
ING

PROGRAM FOR IMPROVED SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL LEND-

(Apr. 7, 1983).
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gram involved: (a) a stricter examination of country exposure, including higher capital-to-loan ratios for banks with greater concentrations of
country exposure; (b) more public disclosure of the country exposure of
banks; (c) the specification of new loan classifications: loss, reservable,
and debt-service impaired, with requirements for write-off or provisions
for reserves in the first two cases; (d) stretch-out of reported income from
loan fees; and (e) increased cooperation with bank regulators abroad,
possibly including a greater sharing of International Monetary Fund
information.2 43
While that proposal seems a little anemic in view of the hemorrhage of deposits at Continental Illinois, it is probably on the right
track. Higher capital requirments, earlier write-offs, and earlier disclosure may be the only effective means of preventing such incidents.
Some of the negative market response to the sudden disclosure of a financial institution's difficulties can be attributed to the unexpected surprise associated with unfavorable information. Surprise would be
minimized under a rule of constant or periodic disclosure. If disclosure
were a continuous process, large depositors could adjust to unfavorable
information by gradually reducing the flow of deposits to troubled
institutions.
2. Regulatzon of Sales Practie.-The transformation of retail bank instruments into investment products is a recent phenomenon. The first
event of significance was the shortening of investors' time horizons due
to the inflationary cycles of the 1970's and early 1980's. Because of inflationary expectations, investors sought to place an increasing proportion of their savings in short-term instruments, like money market
funds,24 4 which were directly competitive with bank deposits. Second,
the inflationary pressures and volatile economic conditions of the late
1970's forced banks to change their view of the proper way to handle the
intermediation function. Borrowing short and lending long was no
longer perceived as an appropriate way to conduct the business of banking. Increasing pressure to match the maturities of assets and liabilities,
coupled with the steady lengthening of asset maturities, required banks
to lengthen the maturity of their liabilities, producing pressure for
longer term retail CDs. These factors have contributed to the development of deposit instruments which compete directly with investment instruments. One clear example is the active involvement by banks in the

243. Id
244. See Mutual FundAssets Up 70%, Am. Banker, Dec. 31, 1981, at 7 (the assets of money
market funds rose from $77 billion in 1980 to $187 billion in 1981).
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merchandising and funding of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs),
which are long-term savings instruments.
As noted above, conventional wisdom has held that insured retail
bank deposits of less than $100,000 should not be regulated as "investments" because there is no credit risk. It is important to remember,
however, that regulation of sales practices is concerned with far more
than simply disclosure of credit risk. Notions of suitability, of fair evaluation of competing alternatives, and of avoiding misleading sales practices are as appropriate for many bank and insurance products as they
are for stocks and bonds. Yet there is no question that different standards have been applied to different types of financial institutions. The
"how to become a millionaire" ads that characterized bank advertising
for IRA products in 1982 should be contrasted with comparable ads for
mutual fund IRA products, which are subject to SEC scrutiny.
B.

Investment Management

Historically, different approaches were developed for the regulation
of investment management functions depending upon whether the manager was -an insurance company, bank, trust company, or investment
adviser, and upon whether a pension fund was involved. In each case,
the principal regulatory concerns were the same: avoiding conflicts of
interest, enforcing fiduciary obligations, and ensuring fairness of sales
practices.
Many insurance company variable account products have been assimilated into the Investment Company Act structure. Most commingled products offered by banks, however, whether for individual trusts
or commingled pension fund assets, are exempt from SEC regulation,
while analogous nonbank products are not. The regulatory ground
rules should be the same regardless of the managing entity. There is no
reason why an independent investment manager who manages assets of
pension funds and other institutions should be regulated by the SEC
while such a manager working for a bank is not. Both should be subject
to the same rules governing advertising and fiduciary obligations.
C

Intemediation

The historical distinction between intermediation and investment
management is based on allocation of risk: only through the latter process does the customer retain the primary risk of loss. In view of this
distinction, only intermediation has been regulated to ensure safety and
soundness. Today, however, banks float the return on money market
accounts with market rates, and many insurance products permit the
insurer to change the returns periodically. It seems clear that the varia-
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bility or "equity" nature of these returns does not make the bank or
insurance company less of an intermediary for which safety and soundness regulation is appropriate. An intermediary may offer "equity products," and if it does, then many of the investment management rules
should apply to it. But if the assets managed are legally the property of
the manager and are available to the manager's creditors, then regulation as an intermediary is also appropriate.
The money market fund pushed this traditional distinction to the
limit. The fund is an equity product, and the assets are plainly not the
property of the investment manager. But just as plainly, when over
$220 billion of the deposit base moves out of banks and into money
market funds,24 5 much of it subject to at least rudimentary checking
powers, something new has happened. As so often occurs in the financial services industry, however, the regulatory system adapted to accomodate this hybrid. In order to compete with banks, money market
funds sought permission from the SEC to quote their shares at a stable
net asset value of one dollar per share-distinctly not an "equity product" way to value the shares of an investment company. The SEC,
whose regulatory domain extends to the valuation of investment companies' net assets, responded by regulating the quality of the asset base of
money market funds, although technically it lacked authority to do so.
The SEC informed the money market funds that if they wished to value
their shares at a stable net asset value-which implies that portfolio investments will be held to maturity and few losses will be realized-then
they would be required to confine their investments to both high quality
assets and short average maturities. 246 The result has been a fairly high
degree of ad hoc safety and soundness regulation, lacking only federal
"deposit" insurance.
Intermediation is the area in which uniformity of regulation fits
least comfortably. Differences between the asset and liability structures
of banks, savings and loan associations, investment companies, and insurance companies have resulted in varied approaches to the regulation
of the soundness and capital adequacy of these institutions. In the case
of banks, for example, reserve requirements, capital adequacy requirements, and loan ceilings for single borrowers are among the require-

245. Gross, Visa Hals Plansfor Mone, Fund,Am. Banker, Dec. 1, 1982, at 1 (quoting statement of Visa U.S.A.).
246. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, RELEASE No. IC-13380, VALUATION OF DEBT
INSTRUMENTS AND COMPUTATION OF CURRENT PRICE PER SHARE BY CERTAIN OPEN-END
INVESTMENT COMPANIES (July I1, 1983) (Money market funds).
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ments imposed by the federal regulators to ensure institutional safety
and soundness.2 4 7
Investment companies, although chartered under state law, are regulated by the SEC under the Investment Company Act, which emphasizes reporting and disclosure, stringent conflict-of-interest rules, and the
prevention of fraudulent and unfair sales practices. 24' The Act's primary focus is on the role of outside directors, rather than on regulatory
supervision. 249 The Act also emphasizes simple capital structures. As
Clark notes, "[investment company] capital structure regulation is so
severe that it virtually eliminates worries about investment company
soundness in the formal sense of freedom from danger of insolvency: because of the limitations on debt an open-end investment company could
hardly ever 'fail' in a discrete sense."' 25 0 The regulatory requirements
imposed on insurance companies by state insurance commissioners, on
the other hand, strictly regulate investments and disallow certain risky
assets.25 '
D.

Custodial Services

A function somewhat related to both intermediation and investment management is the holding of customer or client funds for safekeeping, either with or without any investment management
function.25 2 Since the funds remain the property of the customer, the
custodian is not an intermediary. Such services only involve safekeeping
responsibilities, and therefore are different from intermediation and are
separable from investment management. The custodial services function lends itself to a high degree of uniformity in regulation.
247. For example, the Federal Reserve System has issued regulations relating to the reserve
requirements of all insured banks (as defined at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(h) (1982)). See 12 C.F.R.
§§ 204.1-.123 (1984). Also, the Comptroller of the Currency has promulgated regulations
controlling the lending limits of unsecured loans. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 32.1-. 111 (1984). Finally,
capital adequacy requirements have been the subject of recent proposals by the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller, and the FDIC. See FederalReserve BoardProposed CapitalAdequacy
Guidelines,43 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) 235 (Aug. 6, 1984); FDICProposedRule EstabhhingNew
CapitalAdequacy Level, 43 WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) 156 (July 23, 1984); see also supra note 222.
248. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-9 to -11, -13, -17 (1982).
249. See, for example, section 10 of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10
(1982), which sets forth prohibitions on affiliations of the directors of investment companies.
250. Clark, The Soundness of FinancialIntermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 9 (1976). 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-18( (1982) provides that open-end investment companies are not permitted to issue
senior securities and that borrowings from banks must meet a 300% asset coverage test.
251. See, e.g., N.Y. INSURANCE LAw § 81 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1983) (outlining specific requirements to be met by the reserve investments of a domestic insurer).
252. The basic rule established by the case law is that the relationship between a bank and
its depositors is that of debtor and creditor, not of agent and principal. See, e.g., Kress v.
Central Trust Co., 246 A.D. 76, 78, 283 N.Y.S. 467, 469 (1935), affd, 272 N.Y. 629, 5 N.E.2d
365 (1936); Amsden v. Traders Nat'l Bank, 182 A.D. 474, 475-76, 170 N.Y.S. 316, 317 (1918);
General Fire Assurance Co. v. State Bank, 177 A.D. 745, 750, 164 N.Y.S. 871, 874 (1917).
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E.

Market Activity

The function of acting as broker or dealer includes activities on
both the organized exchanges and the nonexchange dealer markets. In
this area there is a pressing need for consistency. Banks are exempt from
registration under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 as brokerdealers. 5 3 They are permitted to engage in at least some brokerage
functions,2 54 but those are regulated by bank regulators 2 55 that are
themselves questioning the adequacy of this regulatory structure.2 56
Similarly, there seems little basis for the different regulatory schemes for
financial futures, which are regulated by the CFTC, and financial options, which are within the province of the SEC. 257 Both types of options are used by many of the same customers and serve the same
economic functions. Furthermore, there is no good reason why banks
should be permitted to act as futures commission merchants but be
barred from dealing in options. Finally, it seems no more consistent
with safety and soundness considerations for a bank to deal in the highly
volatile currency and treasury securities markets than for it to deal in
investment grade securities. But if banks are permitted to expand their
broker and dealer functions, they should be regulated like other brokerdealers.

253. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)-(5) (1982).
254. 12 U-S.C. § 24 (1982) provides in pertinent part that:
[t]he business of dealing in securities by the [national bank] shall be limited to
purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the
order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, and the
[national bank] shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock; Providedthat the
[national bank] may purchase for its own account investment securities under such
limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller of the Currency may by regulation
prescribe.
See also 49 Fed. Reg. 15,089 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.52) (rules proposed Apr.
17, 1984, by the Comptroller of the Currency dealing with brokerage activities of national
banks). A proposal for conducting brokerage services through separate subsidiaries has been
the subject of discussion between the SEC and the comptroller. Albert, ComptrollerJothsGrowing Protest Against SEC Plan on Bank Brokers, Am. Banker, Feb. 17, 1984, at 1.
255. The regulations of the comptroller dealing with securities purchases by banks for their
own account are found at 12 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.140 (1984).
256. S. 2851, the proposed "Financial Services Competitive Equity Act," seeks to address
some of these concerns, but retains the authority of bank regulators over certain securities
activities of banks. The bill allows depository institutions, through nondepository affiliates, to
underwrite mortgage-backed securities, commercial paper, and all types of municipal revenue
bonds. These activities have been described by Senator Garn as "conservative, safe and sound
securities activities which are closely related to the traditional business of depository institutions." [Current] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) No. 1038, at 3-5 (Aug. 24, 1984).
257. See Ackerman, SEC, CFTCSet Stagefor Transformationof Markets, Legal Times, Feb. 15,
1982, at 36.
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Lendng

Interestingly, lending is the area in which functional regulation is
the most advanced in terms of uniformity of both regulation and administration. Usury laws, 58 truth-in-lending legislation, 59 margin
credit, 2 ' and similar regulatory systems tend to apply with equal force
to all lenders.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Is it necessary to make the effort to create a new paradigm? In our
view, the fragmentation in the current regulatory system has become so
counterproductive that the creation of a new regulatory paradigm has
become essential. When the Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the Currency are at open war over the status of nonbank banks
under the Bank Holding Company Act and the Secretary of the Treasury has to make peace by asking for a moratorium, 26' when literally
hundreds of billions of dollars of the deposit base flow from banks to
money market funds and back to bank money market accounts, 262 and
when the CFTC must negotiate with the SEC about whether the CFTC
should approve a new futures product for trading, 263 then our nation's
regulation of its financial services industry is not being implemented in a
way that is consistent with the public interest. It is time to develop a
new paradigm for the regulation of financial functions and institutions,
not by putting a fresh coat of paint on an old structure, but by starting
anew with a regulatory blueprint drafted along functional lines.

258. See, e.g., The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 501, 94 Stat. 132, 161 (1980) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f7 (1982)).
259. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection (Truth in Lending) Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82
Stat. 146 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982)).
260. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 220.1-.130 (1984).
261. See Comptroller of the Currency, News Release No. NR 83-27 (Apr. 5, 1983); see also
Fuerbringer, Regan Urges Delay in Liflng of Banking Industry Barriers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1983,
at D6, col. 1.
262. See supra note 245.
263. See supra note 257.

